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I. INTRODUCTION
This Article compares the use of unlawfully obtained evidence in
France, the Federal Republic of Germany (Germany), and Italy. In all
three countries, courts and legislatures have adopted exclusionary rules
to deter due process violations during police interrogation, to insure that
suspects are informed of their right to silence during interrogation, and
to deter unlawful searches and seizures.1 These three countries have
adopted exclusionary rules for the same reason that United States courts
have done so: because no other remedy has adequately achieved these
goals.
The history of each country has shaped the development of its ex-
clusionary rule.2 French courts have implemented exclusionary rules for
1. A fourth use of exclusion, introduced by the United States Supreme Court, applies to
evidence obtained from suspect identification or lineup procedures. See Oaks, Studying the
Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. Rv. 665 (1970). This area will not be
discussed in this Article because no parallel body of decision or scholarly literature is available
in Europe. Of the three countries dealt with in this Article, only Italy has adopted a United
States-style lineup. CODICE DI PROCEDURA PENALE [C.P.P.] 1930 Gazetta Ufficiale della
Repubblica Italiana [Gaz. Uff.] No. 862, Oct. 19, 1930, art. 360 (known popularly as the "con-
fronto all'americana"). The means of excluding evidence in French and Italian law is to "nul-
lify" (deprive of legal effect) the part of the procedure based on that evidence. The effect of a
nullity on later stages of the procedure is still debated. See infra notes 382-97 and accompany-
ing text. The Criminal Division of the Italian Supreme Court, the Corte de cassazione Sezione
penale [Corte cass.], has held that although C.P.P. art. 360 provides for a nullity for violations
of the prescribed procedures, the same evidence is still admissible as "circumstantial evidence"
("indizio"). Judgment of Nov. 14, 1975, Corte cass., Italy, 1977 Massimario Annotato 706 no.
861. In France and Germany, no case law has developed around identification procedures,
probably because this is considered a question of the reliability, rather than the legality, of the
evidence. Even in the United States, the real thrust of the identification opinions has been
reliability, despite due process language. See, e.g., United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967);
see also Gibbons, Practical Prophylaxis and Appellate Methodology: The Exclusionary Rule as
a Case Study in the Decisional Process, 3 SETON HALL L. REV. 295, 299 n.19 (1972).
2. For a survey of basic similarities and differences in French, German, Japanese, Span-
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reasons of "public policy," the "rights of defense," and the "good admin-
istration of justice." These concepts are similar to United States notions
of judicial integrity, defendants' rights, and due process. Germany,
which had only a weak tradition of exclusion before World War II, has
developed exclusionary rules to implement provisions in the 1949 Fed-
eral Constitution guaranteeing human dignity and the right to develop
one's personality. Italy, which had no pre-War tradition of excluding
evidence, has derived exclusionary rules from its 1948 Constitution to
protect the civil rights of citizens against unlawful police activity.
In each country, exclusionary rules have emerged from distinct legal
traditions and recent historical experiences. What all three countries
have in common, however, is a desire to guarantee civil rights that were
not adequately protected by alternate safeguards. France, Germany, and
Italy have increasingly expanded the -scope of their exclusionary rules to
accomplish the three purposes described above. In contrast, recent
United States Supreme Court decisions have limited the application of
the exclusionary rule.3
Exclusion of illegally obtained evidence is neither a purely civil-law
nor common-law remedy. The three civil-law countries discussed here
have developed nondiscretionary exclusionary rules which make failure
to exclude grounds for appeal. Common-law England4 and Canada5
ish, and United States criminal procedure, see Weigend, Criminal Procedure: Comparative
Aspects, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 537 (S. Kadish ed. 1983). Each country
differs in the details of investigation, prosecutorial discretion, presentation and evaluation of
evidence, role of the judge and the judgment, and sentencing procedures.
3. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974) (grand jury witness may not refuse to
answer questions on the ground that they are based on evidence obtained from an unlawful
search and seizure); United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741 (1979) (IRS violation of electronic
surveillance regulations did not require exclusion of tape recordings and agent testimony from
evidence); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976) (exclusionary rule not to be extended to
forbid the use in a federal civil proceeding of evidence illegally seized by a law enforcement
agent of a state government); United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980) (no federal supervi-
sory power to suppress evidence obtained by illegal search and seizure of a third party); Wash-
ington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1 (1982) (seizure of evidence discovered in plain view of arresting
authority while in suspect's room incident to arrest does not violate the fourth amendment);
United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982) (warrantless search of containers in moving vehicles
permitted where police officers have probable cause to search the entire vehicle). See Califor-
nia v. Carney, 105 S. Ct. 2066, 2072 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Much of the Court's
'burdensome' workload is a product of its own aggressiveness in this area.").
4. British law remains hostile to exclusion of relevant evidence in criminal cases. In
1984, however, Parliament did reaffirm a three century-old rule of evidence excluding involun-
tary confessions. Attorney General v. Mico, 145 Eng. Rep. 234, 419, 420 (1782); The King v.
Warickshall, 168 Eng. Rep. 234, 235 (K.B. 1783); DPP v. Ping Lin, [1975] All E.R. 188; R. v.
Sang, [1979] 2 All E.R. 1222. The common law rule was affirmed in the Police & Criminal
Evidence Act, 1984, Rule 76(2)(a), The Law Reports-Statutes, part 7, ch.60, at 2735, 2806-
07, forbidding "oppression," and Rule 78(2), id. at 2807, reaffirming "any [previous] rule of
1985]
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have limited exclusionary rules, but oppose nondiscretionary exclusion
except for due process violations during interrogation. Quasi-civil-law
countries such as Scotland6 and Japan,7 as well as common-law Austra-
lia,8 have moved towards exclusion.
A form of the exclusionary rule was employed in France and Ger-
many before the rule was adopted in the United States. In France, as
early as 1672, a proceeding based on an illegal search was "nullified" 9
which, in effect, excluded the evidence.' ° Proceedings were nullified fre-
law requiring a court to exclude evidence." For evidence other than confessions, the Police &
Criminal Evidence Act, 1984, Rule 78(1) allows the trial court to exclude evidence if admis-
sion would have "an adverse effect on the fairness of the proceedings." For British civil cases,
see infra note 295. The common law on confessions in the United States is discussed in People
v. Ditson, 57 Cal. 2d 415, 436, 369 P.2d 714, 20 Cal. Rptr. 165 (1962).
5. When the Canadian Parliament drafted the Canadian Constitution of 1981, it rejected
a rule that would have given judges discretion to include illegally obtained evidence in favor of
a rule giving discretion to exclude unlawful evidence. The practical difference is that under the
rule adopted by the Parliament, the accused has the burden of proving why unlawfully ob-
tained evidence should be excluded, rather than the prosecution proving admissibility:
(1) Anyone whose rights or freedoms, as guaranteed by this Charter, have been
infringed or denied may apply to a court of competent jurisdiction to obtain such
remedy as the court considers appropriate and just in the circumstances. (2) Where,
in the proceedings described under subsection (1), a court concludes that evidence
was obtained in a manner that infringed or denied any rights or freedoms guaranteed
by this Charter, the evidence shall be excluded if it is established that, having regard
to all the circumstances, the admission of it in the proceedings would bring the ad-
ministration of justice into disrepute.
CANADIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS (CONSTITUTION ACT, 1982) art. 24, 1
STATUTES OF CANADA 1980-1983, at 11. A counter proposal, for discretion to include ille-
gally obtained evidence, supported by the Law Reform Commission of Canada, was rejected
by Parliament. LAW REFORM COMMISSION OF CANADA, REPORT 23, QUESTIONING SUS-
PECTS 24-25 (1984) (Principal Consultant Patrick Healy). Although some Canadian judges
have followed the anti-exclusion tendency of the United States Supreme Court, see e.g., Regina
v. Collins, 33 Criminal Reports 3d 130 (1983), the trend in Canada now seems to be in favor of
exclusion for unwarranted searches. See Regina v. Rao, 40 Criminal Reports 3d 1 (1984);
Regina v. Dombrowski [Sask.] 44 Criminal Reports 3d 1 (1985). For other cases, see CANA-
DIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS ANNOTATED § 24(2).
6. In Scotland, "evidence illegally or irregularly obtained is inadmissible unless the ille-
gality or irregularity associated with its procurement can be excused by the court." Research
Paper by Sheriff MacPhail, para. 21.01 (April 1979), cited by Lord Scarman in R. v. Sang,
[1979] 2 All E.R. 1222, 1247. This means that the prosecution has the burden of showing the
court why it should exercise its discretion and admit the evidence. Meng Heang Yeo, Inclusio-
nary Discretion over Unfairly Obtained Evidence, 31 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 392, 394 (1982).
7. 901 HANREIJIH6 15 (1978), 679 JURIST 51 (1978) (in Japanese).
8. See R. PATTENDEN, THE JUDGE, DISCRETION, AND THE CRIMINAL TRIAL 93 (Ox-
ford 1982); see also Cleland v. Shaw, 43 AustL. L.R. 619 (1983).
9. See supra note 1.
10. Judgment of Feb. 12, 1672, Parlement de Toulouse, ANCIEN JOURNAL DU PALAIS I
161, cited in Derrida, Perquisitions et saisies chez les avocats, les avouds et les notaires, 1953




quently in the nineteenth century.I1 In this century, the first French case
to reverse a decision due to an illegal search and seizure occurred in
1910,12 four years before the first United States case.13 United States
scholars recognized an exclusionary rule in West Germany only re-
cently.14 Evidence obtained from an illegal search and seizure, however,
was excluded in Germany as early as 1889.15 Italian law developed ex-
clusionary rules in the 1970's to give effect to the liberal Constitution of
1948.16
II. DUE PROCESS VIOLATIONS
Until modem times, the accused not only was expected to assist in-
vestigators and the court in his or her own conviction, but was forced to
do so. To obtain confessions and other information, torture routinely
was administered in the presence of a magistrate.17 This was an integral
part of sixteenth and seventeenth century French, German, Italian, but
not English, criminal procedure.18 During the eighteenth century, under
the influence of the Enlightenment, judicially administered torture was
11. See Judgment of Jan. 19, 1866, Cour de cassation chambre criminelle [Cass. crim.],
Fr., 1867 Dalloz, P6riodique et critique [D.P. I] 505, 509 (principle accepted); Judgment of
Nov. 25, 1882, Cass. crim., Fr., 1883 D.P. 1 227; Judgment of Dec. 13, 1894, Cass. crim., Fr.,
1899 D.P. 1 457.
12. Judgment of Feb. 18, 1910, Cass. crim., Fr., 1911 Recueil G6n6ral des Lois et des
Arrats [S. Jur. I] 233.
13. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
14. According to Chief Justice Burger, exclusion of illegally obtained evidence is "unique
to American jurisprudence," Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcot-
ics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); see also Wilkey, The Exclusionary Rule:
Why Suppress Evidence, 62 JUDICATURE 215, 216 (1978) (arguing that "one proof of the irra-
tionality of the exclusionary rule is that no other civilized nation has it"). But see Letter from
Professor Kamisar to Michael Klipper, Chief Counsel, Subcommittee on Criminal Law,
United States Senate Judiciary Committee (March 30, 1982) (noting the existence of the exclu-
sionary rule in Germany and citing an earlier version of this author's Article) Hearings on S.B.
101, S.B. 751 and S.B. 1995 Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Law of the Senate Commit-
tee on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 527-618 (1982). For a recent survey, see
Bradley, The Exclusionary Rule in Germany, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1032 (1983).
15. Judgment of Nov. 7, 1889, Reichsgericht in Strafsachen [RGSt], Ger., 20 Ent-
scheidungen des Reichsgerichts in Strafsachen [Entscheidungen des RGSt] 91, 92 (1890)
("This illegally obtained evidence may not be produced at the trial nor used in the decision.").
All the translations in this Article are by the author.
16. COSTITUZIONE DELLA REPUBLICA ITALIANA [COSTITUZIONE] of Jan. 1, 1948, 1947
Gaz. Uff. 849, Dec. 22, 1947. Cordero, Prove illecite nelprocessopenale, 4 RIVISTA ITALIANA
DI DIRITrO E PROCEDURA PENALE [RIv. ITAL. DIR. PRO. PEN.] 32 (1961) (Cordero's wide-
ranging comparative and historical survey could not mention a single Italian exclusion case).
17. 1 P. FIORELLI, LA TORTURA GIUDIZIARIA NEL DIRITrO COMUNE 67 (Milan 1953).
H. MAISONNEUVE, ETUDES SUR LES ORIGINES DE L'INQUISITION 312 (2d ed. Paris 1960).
18. J.H. LANGBEIN, PROSECUTING CRIME IN THE RENAISSANCE: ENGLAND, GER-
MANY, FRANCE 241 (1974); L.W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFrE AMENDMENT 433 (1968).
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abandoned as "cruel and useless."' 9 In practice, however, torture was
often moved from the courtroom to the backroom of the police station.
The widespread use of brutal methods of interrogation by United
States police investigators was revealed in the 1930's by the Wickersham
Commission z° and other reports.21 A comparable situation existed in
Europe even before fascism. Notwithstanding the fact that coercion was
prohibited at every stage of French criminal investigations,2" dozens of
reports during the 1930's revealed the systematic use by the police of
threats, beatings, prolonged isolation, hunger and sleep deprivation.23
While French courts frequently excluded evidence obtained by illegal
searches and seizures, 4 coerced confessions did not receive the same at-
tention." This was mainly because a court's decision regarding a co-
erced confession was not subject to appeal. In pre-War Germany and
Italy, scholars and courts ignored the problem and accepted police prac-
tices without criticism. Pre-War criminal procedure manuals referred to
coerced confessions only in the context of medieval practices.2 6 The pre-
War German Supreme Court, the Reichsgericht, did not report a single
case involving the coerced confession of an adult.27 Presumably,
19. 2 P. FIORELLI, LA TORTURA GUIDIZIARA NEL DIRITTO COMUNE 270 n.2 (1953).
20. WICKERSHAM COMMITTEE REPORT No. II, PART I, THE THIRD DEGREE (1931).
21. See Kauper, Judicial Examination of the Accused-A Remedy for the Third Degree, 30
MICH. L. REV. 1224 (1932); Keedy, The Third Degree and Legal Interrogation of Suspects, 85
U. PA. L. REV. 761 (1937); Note, The Third Degree, 43 HARV. L. REv. 617 (1930).
22. Technically, coercion was prohibited whether the accused was being interrogated by
the judicial police, state attorney (Procureur de la Rdpublique), the magistrate who prepares
the dossier for the trial court (juge d'instruction), or the President of the Tribunal that tries the
case. Keedy, supra note 21, at 767.
23. Id. at 770.
24. See supra note 11.
25. Judgment of Dec. 27, 1935, Cass. crim., Fr., 1936 D.P. 1 20, 22 (stating that a judge
may consider the accused's confessions subsequent to an illegal search and seizure "if they can
be considered to have been made without coercion"). (This is the only case listed in the DAL-
LOZ TABLE ALPHABPTIQUE 1845-1951 dealing with a coerced confession.) In practice, con-
fessions were usually presumed to be freely given, see e.g., Judgment of Jan. 7, 1943, Cour
d'appel, Grenoble, 1943 Sirey Jurisprudence [S. Jur.] 15. P. Mimin, commenting on the Judg-
ment of Dec. 27, 1935, supra, elaborates: "it is pointless to propose a criterion for coercion
since the Court of Cassation grants the trial court the sovereign power of deciding if the nulli-
fied acts influenced other acts (citations omitted). To say an act was coerced would depend on
the circumstances of each case." Note of P. Mimin on Judgment of Dec. 27, 1935, Cass. crim.,
Fr., 1936 D.P. I 20, 21.
26. E.g., H. GERLAND, DER DEUTSCHE STRAFPROZESS 22 (1927). Section 343 of the
German Code of Criminal Law (STRAFGESETZBUCH [STGB]) (1877) prohibited the use of
force to obtain confessions. In practice it was never used. See infra note 27. There have been
references to "unwritten rules" in Erbs, Unzuldssige Vernehmungsmethoden: Probleme des
§ 136a, 4 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 386 (1951).
27. Only three cases of coerced confessions could be found in the Index to cases of the
German Supreme Court before 1940 (REICHSGERICHT IN STRAFSACHEN GENERAL REGIS-
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whatever violence occurred could be ignored. Italian courts and scholars
also were silent concerning treatment of detainees, even after the post-
War restoration of democracy in Italy. Thus, in a celebrated 1957 case,
an extorted and unreliable confession was held admissible by Italy's high-
est court, the Court of Cassation.2 8 The court refused to examine the
method by which the confession was obtained.
Today France, Germany, and Italy have introduced exclusion in va-
rying degrees for due process violations.29 The French Assembly re-
quired exclusion of coerced confessions from 1981 to 1983. 30 In 1950,
soon after Germany ratified its Federal Constitution,31 exclusion for due
process violations was added to the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1877
TER 1-75 (1870-1942)). All involved juveniles and the responsible officials were not held liable
in any of these cases under STGB § 343:
(1) Judgment of March 14, 1882, RGSt, Ger., 6 Entscheidungen des RGSt 82 (1882);
(2) Judgment of May 22, 1894, RGSt, Ger., 25 Entscheidungen des RGSt 366 (1894);
(3) Judgment of Oct. 28, 1937, RGSt, Ger., 71 Entscheidungen des RGSt 374 (1938).
In the United States, the situation was only slightly better. Courts ignored police coercion
in obtaining confessions unless they could suggest these confessions were unreliable on the
facts of the case: See Bran v. United States, 169 U.S. 532 (1897); Ziang Sun Wan v. United
States, 266 U.S. 1, 14 (1924); Brown v. Mississippi, 298 U.S. 278 (1936); Chambers v. Florida,
309 U.S. 27 (1940).
28. Judgment of Dec. 14, 1957 (Egidi), Corte cass., Italy, 1 RiV. ITAL. DIR. PRO. PEN. 564
(1958), partially translated and summarized in M. CAPPELLETTI & W. COHEN, COMPARA-
TIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 495 (1979) (admitting an extorted confession although contra-
dicted by other evidence). This is the only case that 3 VINCENZO MANZINI, TRATTATO DI
DIRITTO PROCESSUALE PENALE ITALIANO 538 n.21 (6th ed. Turin 1970) could cite concerning
a coerced confession. The first case in which a coerced confession was held inadmissible was
the Judgment of April 14, 1970, Corte d'appello [Corte app.], Rome, 125 Giurisprudenza Ital-
iana [Giur. Ital.] II 244, 254 (1973).
29. In this Article, the term "due process violations" refers to physical and psychological
abuse of detainees by the police to obtain statements. The use of exclusion to sanction these
violations was first enunciated in the United States in the case of Rochin v. California, 342 U.S.
165 (1952)(Frankfurter, J.). Frankfurter's distaste for such methods may have been influenced
by his own family's experiences under the National Socialists. Cf. M.E. PARRISH, FELIX
FRANKFURTER AND HIS TIMEs 273 (1982). At first, a minority of Justices, including Frank-
furter, were adverse to relying on "the vague contours of Due Process." Haley v. Ohio, 332
U.S. 596, 602 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Justice Black, in his Rochin concurrence,
also criticized using the "nebulous standards" of the fourteenth amendment, when the Court
might have relied instead on the fifth amendment. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 175
(Black, J., concurring). After Rochin, however, the United States, and other countries, treated
due process violations distinctly from self-incrimination problems.
30. CODE DE PROCf-DURE PfNALE [C. PR. PfN.] (France 1958), art. 63.1 (Law of Feb. 2,
1981, art. 39, 1981 Dalloz L6gislation [D.L.] 86, 90), abrogated by Law of June 10, 1983, art.
17 (L.n. 83-466, 1983 JURIS-CLASSEUR PfRIODIQUE, LA SEMAINE JURIDIQUE [J.C.P.] III No.
54309, 103 Gazette du Palais [Gaz. Pal.] (16g.) 433 (1983).
31. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] (,V. Ger. May 23, 1949), 1949-1950 Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBI]
1985]
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(Strafprozessordnung, hereinafter STPO).32 The Italian Court of Cassa-
tion has not addressed due process violations since 1958, although a
lower court has excluded a coerced confession.33 The disparity between
the exclusionary rules in these three countries reflects different political
forces unleashed after World War II and can best be examined
historically.
A. France
At the close of World War II, France,34 like Germany
35 and Italy,36
was in a state of economic and constitutional chaos. In Germany, the
Allied High Command had the burden of restoring order.37 The United
States had also proposed a provisional military government for France
after liberation from the Vichy government. 38 France, however, rejected
Allied assistance in internal affairs and declared a provisional govern-
ment in 1946. 39 The Constitution of 1946 was designed to solve the con-
stitutional crisis that followed dissolution of the Vichy regime. Its
32. STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG [STPO] Feb. 1, 1877, 1877 Reichsgesetzblatt [RGBI] 253.
Exclusion of involuntary statements was introduced in STPO § 136a, Sept. 12, 1950, 1950
BGBI 455, 484 § 129.
33. Judgment of April 14, 1970, Corte app., Rome, 125 Giur. Ital. II 244, 254 (1973).
34. J.P. Rioux, LA FRANCE DE LA QUATRIPME Rf-PUBLIQUE, No. 1, L'ARDEUR ET LA
NfcEssITf 1944-1952, at 30 et seq. (1980). France suffered over 600,000 military and civilian
deaths, the loss of one-fourth of its real estate, two-thirds of its railroad stations, track and
rolling stock, and coal production.
35. Jones, Currency, Banking, Domestic and Foreign Debt, in GOVERNING POSTWAR
GERMANY 419 (E.H. Litchfield ed. 1953). By 1945, Germany had lost one-third of its real
wealth, one-half of its production capacity, and was saddled with a public debt of RM 400
billion.
36. S.B. CLOUGH, THE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF MODERN ITALY 286 (1964). Italy suf-
fered the loss of 444,500 dead, one-third of its national wealth, 91% of its merchant fleet and
trucks, and one-half of its cars and trains.
37. Litchfield, Political Objectives and Legal Bases for Occupation Government, in Gov-
ERNING POSTWAR GERMANY, supra note 35, at 3.
38. P. NOVICK, THE RESISTANCE VERSUS VICHY 60 (1968); B. LEDWIDGE, DE GAULLE
167 (1982).
39. The French Resistance (Comitifranqais pour la libiration nationale or CFLN) de-
clared itself the provisional government in March 1944. On June 2, the CFLN took the title
Gouvernementprovisoire de la Rdpubliquefranqaise (GpRF). P. NOVICK, supra note 38, at 60.
In 1946, a coalition of Gaullists, Christian Democratic intellectuals, and Communist
workers agreed on the Constitution of Oct. 27, 1946. J. LASSAIGNE, CONSTITUTION DE LA
RifPUBLIQUE FRANqAISE, EXTRAIT DE RECUEIL SIREY (1947). The priambule affirmed the
"rights and liberties of man and the citizen." These provisions are technically still in force
through incorporation in the Constitution of October 4, 1958, JOURNAL OFFICIEL, Oct. 5,
1958. Both the preamble of the Constitution of 1946 and the full text of the Constitution of
1958 are reprinted in 0. KAHN-FREUND, C. LtvY & B. RUDDEN, A SOURCEBOOK OF
FRENCH LAW 18, 188 (2d ed. 1979). J.P. Rioux, supra note 34, at 129; P. WILLIAMS, POLI-
TICS IN POST-WAR FRANCE 25, 167 passim (1954).
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preamble reaffirmed political, economic, and social rights that had been
violated by the Vichy government. These protections, however, were in-
tended as legislative guidelines rather than as a bill of rights to be en-
forced by the judiciary.'
The post-War government passed few provisions reforming criminal
procedure. During World War II, a number of ordinary peace officers
had been given investigative authority, a function traditionally reserved
for the judicial police who serve the State Attorney (Procureur de la R6-
publique).4 1 After the War these men were purged or reassigned to their
former duties. The authority of the judicial police, however, was not
curtailed because they were needed to restore order. In 1944, almost ten
thousand suspected collaborators had been executed without trial and
judicial intervention was imperative to prevent further abuses. To
achieve this objective without foreign aid like that imposed on defeated
Germany, France chose to rely on its police, judiciary, and criminal
codes.42 Over one hundred thousand accused collaborators awaited trial,
in addition to a huge backlog of common criminal cases. Early reform
was a low priority. Moreover, the need for reform was not as great as in
Germany43 because the human rights abuses committed by French police
during the War44 were insignificant compared to the practices of Ger-
man SS forces during the 1940-1944 occupation of France.45
As a result of this history, due process violations typical of pre-War
France continued after the War. During the late 1940's, French police
40. Pelloux, La nouvelle Constitution de la France, 1946 D. Chronique 81.
41. Patin, La restauration de la ldgalitd rdpublicaine dans nos codes ripressifs, 1946 REV.
SC. CRIM. 39, 47. About 5,000 police were suspended throughout France. P. NovICK, supra
note 38, at 84. On the organization of French police today, see J. AUBERT & R. PETIT, LA
POLICE EN FRANCE 110, 249 (1981).
42. J.P. RIoux, supra note 34, at 54; B. LEDWIDGE, supra note 38, at 204; P. NovICK,
supra note 38, at 76, 96, 143. A. WERTH, FRANCE 1940-1955, at 286 (1956) (reporting that
5,234 summary executions were carried out before the Liberation, and 3,114 after the Libera-
tion, without trial. After Liberation, 1,325 death sentences were passed by ad hoc tribunals).
43. During the war, the German SS (Schutzstaffe0, originally Hitler's elite bodyguard,
had taken control of all German police forces, including those assigned to public order and
crime, and of the State Secret Police (Geheime Staatspolizei or Gestapo). Both the SS and the
Gestapo, as well as the Sicherheitsdienst (SD), had extra-judicial special intelligence branches.
For practices of the Gestapo in Germany, see infra notes 96-99. For the SS in France, see
Lalanne & Baudry, Chronique de police, 1948 REV. sC. CRIM. 115.
44. Patin, La restauration de la legalitd ripublicaine, 1946 REv. SC. CRIM. 39, 47.
45. Lalanne & Baudry, supra note 43, at 114. To exculpate themselves, local police attrib-
uted atrocities to the SS units. In fact, even the German military forces (Abwehr) exculpated
themselves in this fashion. R. GRUNBERGER, A SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE THIRD REICH 145
(1971).
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continued to use violence46 and torture,47 occasionally causing death.4
These practices occurred despite a statute prohibiting police from using
unreasonable force in the exercise of their duties. 9 In the 1950's the
French judicial system was still burdened with many of the same
problems it had known before the War: arbitrary arrests,50 poorly
trained and underpaid officers,51 inadequate legal guidelines,52 and little
political or judicial control over the police. The French Court of Cassa-
tion continued to ignore due process violations by the police, applying
one standard for the judiciary and another for the police. Thus in 1952,
the Court of Cassation excluded evidence illegally obtained by an exam-
ining magistrate (fuge d'instruction );53 the court, however, refused to
nullify evidence54 when judicial police officers violated statutorily pre-
scribed interrogation procedures.
55
Since 1954, no cases of physical abuse during interrogations have
been published, although there is evidence that unjustified force occa-
46. See Judgment of Mar. 9, 1950, Cour d'appel, Bourges, 1950 J.C.P. II No. 5594 (arson
suspect beaten by members of judicial police, Feb. 25, 1947).
47. See Judgment of Aug. 9, 1944, Tribunal correctionnel, Bordeaux, reported in A. MEL-
LOR, L'INSTRUCTION CRIMINELLE 281 (1952). Cf A. MELLOR, LA TORTURE 301, 304, 315,
320 (2d ed. 1961); Donnedieu de Vabres, La reforme de l'Instruction prdparatoire, 1949 REV.
SC. CRIM. 499, 501.
48. See Judgment of Feb. 18, 1954, Cass. crim., Fr., 1954 D. Jur. 165 (burglary suspect
died in detention, Feb. 20, 1946).
49. CODE PtNAL [C. PPN.] art. 86 (France). Art. 86 has never been invoked for due
process violations during interrogation.
50. Ladhari, La libertd individuelle et ses garanties constitutionnelles, 1952 D. Chronique
101, 102 n.9.
51. A. MELLOR, LA TORTURE 299 (2d ed. 1961); A. MELLOR, L'INSTRUCTION
CRIMINELLE 241 (1952).
52. R. MERLE & A. VITU, TRAITf_ DE DROIT CRIMINEL: PROCtDURE PtNALE 310 (3d
ed. 1979). See also P. WILLIAMS, POLITICS IN POST-WAR FRANCE 193 n.9 (1954); P.M. WIL-
LIAMS, FRENCH POLITICIANS AND ELECTIONS 1951-1967, at 25, 47, 87, 97 (1970) (French
Assembly Deputies harassed by Parisian police in 1950).
53. Judgment of June 12, 1952, Cass. crim., Fr., 1952 J.C.P. II No. 7241 (Juge
d'instruction disguises voice on telephone to trap accused into making incriminating state-
ments). Judgment of Mar. 15, 1973, Cass. crim., Fr., 1973 D.S. Jur. 338.
54. In France, a nullity necessarily means exclusion. C. PR. PPAN. arts. 172 and 173 re-
quire removal from the defendant's dossier of documents annulled for violating the defendant's
rights. No further use may be made of these documents on pain of diciplinary action. C. PR.
PtN. art. 170 requires nullification of all documents and subsequent procedures for interroga-
tion violations. Judgment of Mar. 9, 1981, Cass. crim., Fr., 1982 D.S. Jur. 511 note W. Jean-
didier. When only a part of a document is nullified, the nullified section is to be rendered
illegible. Judgment of Mar. 18, 1976, Cass. crim., Fr., 1976 D.S. Jur. 548 note J.-M. Robert,
1976 J.C.P. II No. 18478 note P. Chambon, 96 Gaz. Pal. II 532 (unsigned note) (1976). Judg-
ment of June 30, 1981, Cass. crim., Fr., 1981 J.C.P. IV No. 341.
55. Judgment of Oct. 21, 1980, Cass. crim., Fr., 1981 D.S. Jur. 104 note D. Mayer.
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sionally is used. 6 Instead, the focus of the controversy has shifted to the
prolonged interrogation session known as the garde d vue. The garde d
vue, literally a "keeping in sight," entails custodial detention until the
suspect can be brought before the public prosecutor.5 7 Originally, the
garde d vue applied to suspects apprehended while committing a crime.5 8
In 1903, a delay of up to twenty-four hours was permitted to allow trans-
fer of these suspects to the Procureur who could release, provisionally
release, or charge and begin judicial proceedings. In the 1930's and
1940's, French police prolonged the garde d vue beyond twenty-four
hours if they felt a detainee was about to confess.5 9 In 1958 the garde d
vue officially was sanctioned by articles 63 and 77 of the new Code of
Criminal Procedure.60 Twenty-four hours was established as the statu-
tory limit for a detention. 61 The time period could be doubled by the
Procureur. Extensions totalling seventy-two and even ninety-six hours
currently are authorized for some crimes. 62 There is no real penalty,
however, for "unlawful" extensions beyond four days.63
French police maintain that the garde d vue is an essential tool and
early commentators accepted it as a "simple inconvenience."'  Current
criticisms of the garde d vue have focused on four areas. First, it is seen
56. Merle, La garde d vue, 89 Gaz. Pal. H 18, 19 (1969); SYNDICAT DES AVOCATS DE
FRANCE, L'INSTRUCTION: LA DfFENSE BAILLONfE 111 (Marseilles, April 26-27, 1980) [here-
inafter cited as LA Df-FENSE BAILLONf-E]; additional literature in Grebing, Staatsanwaltschaft
und Strafverfolgungspraxis in Frankreich, in 1 FUNKTION UND TATIGKEIT DER AN-
KLAGEBEHORDE IM AUSLXNDISCHEN REcIrr 32 n.54 (H.H. Jescheck & R. Leibinger eds.
1979). London Times, Sept. 24, 1985, at 6 (Rouen police indicted for "torture and barbaric
acts" against detainees).
57. The Procureur de la Rjpublique technically is also a magistrate. The Procureur at-
tends the same faculty as judges (L'Ecole nationale de la Magistrature) and may in fact serve as
a judge within the course of his or her career. Vouin, The Role of the Prosecutor in French
Criminal Trials, 18 AM. J. COMP. L. 483 (1970).
58. D6eret of May 20, 1903, art. 307, cited in Ladhari, supra note 50, at 103.
59. See supra note 22.
60. C. PR. PfN. arts. 63 & 77 (Fr., 1958).
61. Merle, supra note 56, at 19.
62. CODE DE LA SANTfi PUBLIQUE art. 627-1 (Law of Feb. 2, 1982, art. 39-V), 1981
Dalloz, Ldgislation [D.L.] 90. The French bar and the police were divided as to when the
garde d vue begins. Mimin, La nouvelle enquite policire, 1959 J.C.P. I No. 1500 n.11. The
garde d vue may begin at any of these stages: (1) when the suspect is caught in the act;
(2) when the suspect is first brought to the police station; (3) when the suspect voluntarily
appears for questioning; or (4) when the suspicions of the police are aroused during interroga-
tion. The Court of Cassation has now decided the garde d vue does not commence until the
detainee is notified that it has begun. Judgment of March 23, 1982, reviewed in 102 Gaz. Pal.
Recueil des Sommaires [Som.] 290 (1982).
63. See infra notes 77-87.
64. Judgment of Mar. 17, 1960, Cass. crim., Fr., 1960 J.C.P. II No. 11641, III(b) note P.
Chambon ("une simple gine").
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as an infringement on personal liberty. Anyone in the hands of judicial
police officers65 can be subjected to a garde d vue. This might include
suspects arrested en flagrant delit, that is, actually committing or sus-
pected of committing a crime.66 In addition, although the judicial police
cannot arrest witnesses and interrogate them, witnesses who appear "vol-
'67untarily" may be detained and subjected to a garde d vue.
Until 1980, French courts had never questioned the validity of ar-
rests en flagrant dilit as a means of subjecting a suspect to a garde d
vue.68 The Court of Cassation now requires some evidence of a crime
before an arrest can justify an unwarranted search followed by an inter-
rogation. The penalty for conducting an unjustified search and interro-
gation is exclusion.69 French scholars no longer believe that the garde d
vue is a "simple inconvenience. '70  With respect to "voluntary" wit-
nesses, however, no branch of the French government has shown any
willingness to interfere with police discretion to carry out a garde d vue.
65. Only officers of the judicial police may conduct a garde d vue (C. PR. PAN. art. 64), not
the non-officers (agents) who assist them (C. PR. PAN. art. 20).
66. Despite the fact that officers of the judicial police may not interrogate suspects
"against whom there exists serious evidence indicating guilt" (C. PR. PAN. art. 105, see infra
note 198), they may do so in cases of "flagrant" crimes. Judgment of Aug. 11, 1980, Cass.
crim., Fr., Bulletin des arr~ts de ]a cour de cassation, chambre criminelle [Bull. crim.] No. 234
at 607, reviewed in 102 Gaz. Pal. Som. 290 (1982). The definition of "flagrant ddlit" in the
Code (C. PR. PAN. art. 53) is broad and covers suspects (1) caught in the act and (2) caught
after pursuit with hue and cry ("par la clameurpublique"). The definition reflects the sum-
mary procedure historically accorded criminals caught in the act. See Judgment of May 30,
1980, Cass. crim., Fr., 1981 D.S. Jur. 533 note W. Jeandidier; Mayer, Plaidoyer pour une
redefinition du flagrant delit, 1980 D. Chronique 99. The rationale behind allowing interroga-
tion of suspects caught in flagrant dilit is the necessity of preserving evidence which might be
lost if the police had to wait for ajuge d'instruction to hear the case. (For a similar summary
proceeding at common law, cf. T.F.T. PLUCKNETT, CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON
LAW 430 (5th ed. 1956)). C. PR. PAN. art. 53 also permits police interrogations (3) for suspects
showing "traces or clues" ("traces ou indices") suggesting participation in a crime. This provi-
sion is equivalent to interrogation for probable cause. It may be undertaken even without the
need to preserve evidence. See infra note 261.
67. J. AUBERT & R. PETIT, supra note 41, at 260. L. LAMBERT, FORMULAIRE DES OF-
FICIERS DE POLICE JUDICIAIRE 235 (1985). Grebing, supra note 56, at 30. Ladhari, supra note
50, at 102. Cf Judgment of Jan. 5, 1973, Cass. crim., Fr., 1973 D.S. Jur. 541 (suspect detained
10 hours by police because he did not resemble the photo on his identification card). Witnesses
who fail to appear before the police "voluntarily" may be summoned under a letter rogatory
from a juge d'instruction delegating his authority to the judicial police. C. PR. PfAN. arts. 152
and 101.
68. On the contrary, the Court of Cassation has the right to substitute new grounds for an
arrest made on erroneous grounds even in a case when '!flagrant d~lit" was not alleged. Judg-
ment of Jan. 5, 1973, Cass. crim., Fr., 1973 D.S. Jur. 541.
69. Judgment of May 30, 1980, Cass. crim., Fr., 1981 D.S. Jur. 533, 101 Gaz. Pal. II 221
(1981), 1980 J.C.P. IV No. 299.
70. J. PRADEL, DROIT PANAL § 313, at 346 (1980).
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A second criticism of the garde d vue is that it violates the suspect's
legal defense rights.7 1 Under French law, suspects "against whom there
is significant evidence of guilt" should not be interrogated by the police,
but instead should be transferred to ajuge d'instruction who must advise
the suspect of the right against self-incrimination.72 The Court of Cassa-
tion has nullified evidence and trials based upon evidence obtained before
such suspects were informed of the right against self-incrimination.
7 3
Third, critics charge that the garde d vue is inherently coercive.
During the period of the garde d vue, the detainee is kept incommuni-
cado and relentlessly questioned to the point of exhaustion. Psychologi-
cal pressures designed to overbear the will of the suspect are acceptable. 4
Some French police describe the garde d vue as "legitimate torture";
75
however, French courts have shown no interest in reviewing these
techniques.
The fourth objection to the garde d vue is that legislative attempts to
limit detention have been ignored. French police frequently disregard
Code provisions concerning the preconditions and duration of the garde
d vue.76 Most scholars have urged that courts use exclusion for Code
violations; 77 however, the Court of Cassation has consistently limited
relief to individual criminal and civil actions against the police.78 This
relief is illusory because penal sanctions for police violence have been
restrictively interpreted by the courts.79 Furthermore, actions against
71. Le Droit de defense, a widely used term in French law, includes various rights guaran-
teed to suspects by the Codes and case law. Examples include the right to remain silent, the
right to counsel (and to be informed that this right exists), the right not to take an oath (i.e. the
right not to tell the truth).
72. C. PR. PAN. art. 105. See infra notes 191-206. Art. 152 forbids officers of the judicial
police to interrogate a suspect after indictment.
73. Judgment of Feb. 13, 1975, Cass. crim., Fr., 1977 J.C.P. II No. 18727; erratum II No.
18746 bis (1977).
74. This is grounds for exclusion in German law (STPO § 136a) and United States law
(Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469 (1966); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978)).
75. 2 R. MERLE & A. ViTu, supra note 52, § 952, at 168.
76. Judgment of Mar. 17, 1960, Cass. crim., Fr., 1960 J.C.P. II No. 11641; Judgment of
Oct. 10, 1968, Cass. crim., Fr., 1969 J.C.P. II No. 15741; Judgment of Oct. 15, 1974, Cass.
crim., Fr., 1974 Dalloz-Sirey Informations Rapides [D.S.I.R.] 236; Judgment of Oct. 21, 1980,
Cass. crim., Fr., 1981 D.S. Jur. 104.
77. 2 R. MERLE & A. Vrru, supra note 52, § 1073, at 320; G. STAFANI, G. LEVASSEUR &
B. BOULOC, PRfC1S DALLOZ DE PROCADURE PtNALE § 277, at 299 (1lth ed. 1980); J.
PRADEL, DRorr PtNAL § 317, at 348 (1980).
78. See supra note 76.
79. E.g., C. PAN. art. 186. 2 P. BOUZAT & J. PINATEL, TRAITf, DE DROIT P]NAL ET DE
CRIMINOLOGIE § 1302, at 1242 (2d ed. 1970) ("These penal sanctions are no more used than
the disciplinary sanctions; in practice they serve no role other than intimidation.").
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the police are time consuming, expensive, and difficult to prosecute.8"
Suits against ajuge d'instruction or a prosecutor who ordered a garde d
vue are permitted under the Code of Criminal Procedure x but these suits
also have little chance of success. In theory, a Parisian magistrate is as-
signed to supervise current gardes d vue. In practice, the magistrate acts
only when requested to do so82 and a detainee held incommunicado is in
no position to contact the magistrate.
In the absence of judicial control, only administrative measures re-
main. Administrative controls within the police department, such as
promotion incentives, may prevent gross abuses of detainees. Neverthe-
less, the primary concern of the police is to solve crimes, and they are
unlikely to pay more attention to civil liberties than the courts.
The unwillingness of the Court of Cassation to nullify irregular
gardes d vue reflects the entrenched power of the French police. In 1981
the legislature changed the Code of Criminal Procedure to allow exclu-
sion for an irregular garde d vue.83 Under police pressure, however, these
provisions were abrogated in 1983.84 The short-lived changes threatened
to permit or even require the courts to examine police conduct inside the
police station. Had these reforms lasted longer, they would have resulted
in a fundamental shift in power. Thus, it appears that exclusion was
rejected as a remedy for due process violations not because it was ineffec-
tive, but because it was too effective a deterrent.
80. The Procureur de la Republique may refuse to accept the case. If the Procureur re-
fuses, a private party may bring an action civile (private prosecution) under C. PR. PaN. art. 2,
which the Procureur must be invited to join. C. PR. PPN. art. 82. Grebing, supra note 56, at 36;
Weigend, Prosecution: Comparative Aspects, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE
1296, 1303 (S. Kadish ed. 1983). The action civile has the advantage of providing damages to
the victim. The last reported suit against the judicial police for a garde d vue irregularity was
in 1954 for a death that had occurred in 1946. Judgment of Feb. 18, 1954, Cass. crim., Fr.,
1954 D. Jur. 165. 2 R. MERLE & A. VITU, supra note 52, at 916.
81. C. PR. PtN. art. 136. Amselek, Les vicissitudes de la compitencejurisdictionelle en
matire d'atteinte administrative d la libertJ individuelle., 1965 REVUE DE DROIT PUBLIQUE
801.
82. LA DtFENSE BAILLONtE, supra note 56, at 110 (Report of M. Sadon, Procureur Gdn-
dral at Paris, related by Franck Natali (Evry)).
83. C. PR. PtN. art. 63.1 (Law of Feb. 2, 1981, art. 39, 1981 D. S. L. 86, 90) (repealed, see
infra note 84). This short-lived law also extended the garde d vue to 72 hours for certain
crimes (kidnappings, hostage taking and use of arms in committing crimes). For the legislative
history, see P6rier-Daville, La Loi "Sdcuritd et libert'"adoptde par le Parlement, 101 Gaz. Pal.
doct. 20, 24 (1981). Cf. Circulaire du garde des sceaux, ministre de la justice, du 21 Octobre
1981 relative aux orientations nouvelles de politique criminelle, 1981 J.C.P. III No. 51964, 12"
"La garde d vue."




Exclusion for due process violations is rare in France.85 The Court
of Cassation has expanded the use of exclusion, based on rationales of
public policy and the "good administration of justice,"86 into areas where
it was not provided for in the Code of Criminal Procedure. These exten-
sions of the exclusionary rule, however, have not been applied to due
process violations by the police.87 As a result, detainees in France are
generally treated far worse than suspects held by United States or Ger-
man police interrogators.
B. Germany
Exclusion of statements obtained without due process was intro-
duced in Germany in 195088 in reaction to the judicial system created
under the National Socialists.89 The main criticisms of the Nazi legal
system can be summarized as follows: 1) The introduction of new crimi-
nal codes; 2) the creation of extraordinary People's Courts; 3) the Nazifi-
cation of the judiciary; 4) the transfer of judicial functions to the police;
and 5) the introduction of a new, state secret police force (Geheime Staat-
spolizei or Gestapo) whose actions could not be challenged in either a
judicial or administrative appeal.
In 1934 Hitler, as Reichskanzler, decreed new provisions that sub-
stantially changed the 1877 German Criminal Code and Code of Crimi-
nal Procedure.90 The most radical innovation was the installation of so-
called "People's Courts" (Volksgerichtshdfe) with unlimited and unap-
pealable jurisdiction.91 The People's Courts were to render decisions
within twenty-four hours92 and had to approve the choice of an attor-
85. The Judgment of Dec. 12, 1962, Cour d'appel, Douai, 83 Gaz. Pal. 1 407 (1963), 1963
Dalloz, sommaires [D. som.] 76 (suppressing evidence because of a "total irregularity" of the
garde d vue) remains an isolated precedent.
86. See Judgment of Mar. 14, 1974, Cass. crim., Fr., 1974 D.S. Jur. 604, 605 note J.M.
Robert.
87. Puech, Garde d vue, JURIS-CLASSEUR DE PROC]fDURE P]fNALE arts. 53-73, Com-
mentaires 26 (Sept. 1983).
88. STPO § 136a. See supra note 32.
89. R. GRUNBERGER, A SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE THIRD REICH 116 (1971); P. HoFF-
MANN, THE HISTORY OF THE GERMAN RESISTANCE 1933-1945, at 524 (1977); Loewenstein,
Justice, in GOVERNING POSTWAR GERMANY, supra note 35, at 236; H. SCHORN, DER
RICHTER IM DRrrrEN REICH 62 (1959); Wagner, Die Umgestaltung der Gerichtsverfassung
und des Verfahrens- und Richterrechts im nationalsozialistischen Staat, in QUELLEN UND
DARSTELLUNGEN ZUR ZEITGESCHICHTE, Band 16/1 DIE DEUTSCHE JUSTIZ UND DER NA-
TIONALSOZIALISMUSpassim (1968).
90. Gesetz zur Anderung von Vorschriften des Strafrechts und des Strafverfahrens, April
24, 1934, 1934 RGBI 341 (Ger.).
91. Id. art. IV § 2.
92. Id.
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ney.9 3 In addition, the judiciary was subjected to a process of Nazifica-
tion; nonconforming judges were removed, and Nazi zealots were
appointed as presidents of most courts.94 Under the Nazis, many legal
functions were taken out of the hands of the judiciary and given to the
police.95 The Ministry of Justice directed police to make routine use of
"intensified interrogations" (Verschdrfte Vernehmungen).96 The State Se-
cret Police (Gestapo) acted free of judicial restraints, and defendants ac-
quitted by a court sometimes were murdered by Gestapo death squads,97
or arrested in court after acquittal and deported.98 On other occasions
the courts themselves acquitted defendants and handed them over to the
Gestapo for deportation.99
At the end of World War II, the Allies established military courts in
Germany, though not in France and Italy, and carefully screened the
civilian police before rearming and reinstating them."O Nevertheless, the
Germans themselves did not have complete confidence in their' own po-
lice forces after the War. Thus, the German Legislature (Bundestag)'1 '
added an exclusionary statute, STPO section 136a, 102 to its Code of
Criminal Procedure, which had been reinstated in 1950 in its pre-1933
form.l0 3 The original justification for an exclusionary statute was to pre-
vent repetition of the practices that had occurred under the National So-
93. Id. art. IV § 3.
94. Gesetz zur Wiederherstellung des Berufsbeamtentums, April 7, 1933, 1933 RGB1 175
(Ger.). Loewenstein, Justice, in GOVERNING POSTWAR GERMANY, supra note 35, at 246
n.42.
95. Kempner, Police Administration, in GOVERNING POSTWAR GERMANY, supra note 35,
at 403, 406.
96. "Intensified interrogations," including excessive exercise, sleep deprivation and can-
ings (up to 20 or 25 were permitted without medical supervision), were ordered for Marxists,
resistance members and other anti-social elements. R. GRUNBERGER, supra note 89, at 126; P.
HOFFMANN, supra note 89, at 521; Wagner, supra note 89, at 303.
97. P. HOFFMANN, supra note 89, at 242; R. GRUNBERGER, supra note 89, at 110, 124,
357, 447.
98. P. HOFFMANN, supra note 89, at 527; Wagner, supra note 89, at 301.
99. Wagner, supra note 89, at 301 n.47.
100. DOCUMENTS ON GERMANY UNDER OCCUPATION 1945-1954, at 31, 88 (B.R. von
Oppen ed. 1955). L.D. CLAY, DECISION IN GERMANY 245, 255 (1950). German courts were
reopened after denazification procedures in Fall 1945.
101. For early Bundestag history, see Dorr & Bretton, Legislation, in GOVERNING POST-
WAR GERMANY, supra note 35, at 207, 208.
102. STPO § 136a, Sept. 12, 1950, 1950 BGB1 455, 484 § 129. STPO § 136a requires the
exclusion of all statements obtained through coercion (ill-treatment, fatigue, drugs, torture,
deception or hypnosis) even if the accused should later consent to their use. This last provision
was evidently intended to avoid apparent "consent" induced by the fear that coercion would be
introduced if the accused retracted. For a French example, see Judgment of Mar. 9, 1950,
Cour d'appel, Bourges, 1950 J.C.P. II No. 5594.
103. 1949 & 1950 BGBI 631.
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cialists. " The courts also initially rationalized this statute by recalling
the "painful experience" of the past. 10 Only later, when these fears had
subsided, was the deterrence rationale replaced by a constitutional
one:10 6 the guarantee of human dignity.1
0 7
Exclusion was a new approach in German law, stemming from fears
of fascism. 08 The novelty of an exclusionary rule is evident from the fact
that German law, unlike French law, 10 9 did not have a doctrine of nulli-
ties" 0 to exclude illegally obtained evidence. The only recorded case in
which exclusion was used occurred in 1889 and involved a search and
seizure problem."' This case, however, effectively was negated in
1914.112 Exposure to common-law systems may have influenced the de-
velopment of a German exclusionary rule," 3 but fear of the German po-
lice was probably a more significant factor. Although the Allies had
restaffed police forces with men who had been cleared of Nazi charges,
many of those remaining had served during the Hitler era. 1 4 Despite
104. Comment by Representative Greve, speaking in the Bundestag on July 26, 1950,
quoted in 1 I.OWE-ROSENBERG, DIE STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG UND DAS GERICHTSVERFAS-
SUNGSGEsETz: GROSSKOMMENTAR § 136a, at 860 (22nd ed. 1971). See infra note 108.
105. Judgment of Oct. 30, 1951, Bundesgerichtshof in Strafsachen [BGHSt], W. Ger., I
Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofs in Strafsachen [Entscheidungen des BGHSt] 387, 387
(1951).
106. Judgment of Feb. 16, 1954, BGHSt, W. Ger., 5 Entscheidungen des BGHSt 333
(1954).
107. GG art. 1 (WV. Ger.).
108. "Because of our recent past experience, we saw no other possibilities to avoid repeti-
tions." Statement by Representative Greve, supra note 104.
109. For early examples of exclusion through nullification, see Judgment of April 30, 1857,
Cour impriale, Fr., 1859 D.P. II 205; Judgment of Jan. 19, 1866, Cass. crim., Fr., 1867 D.P. I
505, 509 (principle accepted); Judgment of Feb. 4, 1898, Cour. cass., Fr., 1898 D.P. I 229
(omission of "right to counsel" warning).
110. Italy borrowed its concept of nullifying improper procedures (e.g., CODICE DI
PROCEDURA PENALE [C.P.P] arts. 184, 189, 412, 471) from France. Presutti, Legalitd e discre-
zionalitd nella disciplina delle nullitd processuli penali, 19 RIVISTA ITALIANA DI DIRITO E
PROCEDURA PENALE [Rv. IT. DIR. PRO. PEN.] 1178, 1186 n.32 (1976).
111. Judgment of Nov. 7, 1889, Reichsgericht in Strafaschen [RGSt], Ger., 20 Ent-
scheidungen des RGSt 91 (1890).
112. Judgment of June 3, 1913, RGSt, Ger., 47 Entscheidungen des RGSt 195 (1914). The
Reichsgericht, while declaring that the "prohibition against a seizure contains in it the prohibi-
tion against using it as evidence," nevertheless permitted use of illegally obtained letters be-
cause the judge had read the letters and should not have to go through the "worthless
formality" of returning them and demanding them again. The result of this rejection in 1913
of a "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine was that Germany did not have another exclusion
case until after World War II. An early argument for exclusion, E. BELLING, DIE BEWEIs-
VERBOTE ALS GRENZEN DER WAHRHEITSFORSCHUNG IM STRAFPROZESS, in 46 STRAFRECH-
TLICHE ABHANDLUNGEN 37 (1903), received little attention until after the War.
113. Judgment of Aug. 15, 1951 (Urteil Nr. 677), Court of Appeals-American Bernfung-
sgericht, W. Ger., 7 JURISTENZEITUNG [JZ] 373 (1952).
114. Kempner, Police Administration, in GOVERNING POSTWAR GERMANY, supra note 35,
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police retraining programs designed to instill public service values,
abuses such as warrantless searches continued.
1 15
It was impossible during the brief period of the Allied Occupation' 16
to reverse all the authoritarian practices of the German police, some of
which pre-dated the Hitler era. 117 Nevertheless, in Germany, unlike
France, Allied influence and the discredited status of the police forces
created a new practice and philosophy in criminal procedure at a critical
stage in its development. As a result of the Nazi experience, German
police today exercise comparatively little political influence."' Further-
more, a strong and independent judiciary was able to implement the ex-
clusionary statute, placing it on a constitutional footing in 1954,' 9 and
applying it in all cases by the close of the decade.1
20
STPO section 136a was originally aimed at involuntary confessions,
but its uses have expanded greatly over the past three and one-half de-
cades. Judgments of the 1950's frequently dealt with physical coercion,
including deprivation of sleep' 21 or cigarettes, 122 or the use of truth se-
rum. 23 During the 1960's the German Supreme Court, the Bundesger-
ichtshof (BGH), dealt with more subtle problems including infliction of
at 403, 407. The goals of the Allied Occupation, which dates officially from May 8, 1945 to
May 5, 1955, were Demilitarization, Denazification, Decentralization, Democratization and
(with regard to the German police) Delimitization. This program is sometimes known as the
"big D's." Delimitization was most successful in the large city police forces. Id.
115. Id. at 410-11. In Bavaria in 1948,42,228 out of 50,033 searches were conducted with-
out warrants. Warrantless searches remain a problem in Germany. See infra note 332.
116. The Occupation Statute of 8 April 1949 (Washington)/11 April 1949 (Berlin) granted
the Federal and state governments "full legislative, executive and judicial powers in accord-
ance with the Basic Law and with their respective constitutions." The Statute is reprinted in
GOVERNING POSTWAR GERMANY, supra note 35, at 616-18.
117. Kempner, supra note 114, at 409.
118. Arzt, Responses to the Growth of Crime in the United States and West Germany, 12
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 43 (1979).
119. Judgment of Feb. 16, 1954, BGHSt, W. Ger., 5 Entscheidungen des BGHSt 333
(1954). The Constitutional Basis for STPO § 136a had been proposed earlier by scholars, e.g.,
Erbs, Unzuldssige Vernehmungsmethoden, 4 NJW 386 (1951).
120. See Judgment of March 4, 1958, BGHSt, W. Ger., 11 Entscheidungen des BGHSt 211
(1958); Judgment of March 24, 1959, BGHSt, W. Ger., 13 Entscheidungen des BGHSt 60
(1960).
121. Judgment of March 24, 1959, BGHSt, W. Ger., 13 Entscheidungen des BGHSt 60
(1960).
122. Judgment of May 7, 1953, BGHSt, W. Ger., 5 Entscheidungen des BGHSt 290
(1954); Judgment of Nov. 18, 1983, BGHSt, W. Ger., 4 NEUE ZEITSCHRIFr FOR
STRAFRECHT [NSTZ] 209 (1984) (confessions by drug addicts).




mental distress, 124 coercion by third parties,125  and promises of
advantage. 
1 26
Since the 1970's, however, the BGH has increasingly relied on STPO
section 136a for evidence not obtained by "due process violations" dur-
ing interrogation within the original meaning of section 136a. Thus in
1978, a confession obtained by an impermissible wiretap was held inad-
missible even though the accused had not been mistreated during interro-
gation. To reach its conclusion, the BGH drew an analogy to section
136a, which barred an involuntary confession even if the accused later
consented to its use. The BGH held that just as coercion will make
"later statements" inadmissible, so the illegal wiretap rendered the con-
fession inadmissible. 127 In a remarkable extension, the BGH recently ap-
plied section 136a provisions forbidding "deception" ("Tauschung") in
obtaining confessions to statements obtained by the police through an
unwarranted, though otherwise permissible, 2 wiretap. 12 9 In this case, a
Turkish-speaking German police officer induced the accused to make
statements on the telephone concerning a drug smuggling operation.
The combination of section 136a and the absence of a warrant made the
statements inadmissible. The court did not decide whether the absence of
a warrant alone would have sufficed to exclude the evidence.
While previous decisions concentrated on STPO section 136a as a
means of preventing due process violations before trial, one court of ap-
peals has invoked it to influence the behavior of the trial court rather
than the police. The Dusseldorf Court of Appeals has forbidden courts
to draw any conclusions from the refusal of the accused to speak to the
124. Judgment of Oct. 7, 1960, BGHSt, W. Ger., 15 Entscheidungen des BGHSt 187
(1961) (accused forced to view his victim's corpse).
125. Judgment of June 28, 1961, BGHSt, W. Ger., 16 Entscheidungen des BGHSt 165
(1962) (accused must prove that coercion by foreign police took place).
126. Judgment of Sept. 14, 1965, BGHSt, W. Ger., 20 Entscheidungen des BGHSt 268
(1966).
127. Judgment of Feb. 22, 1978, BGHSt, W. Ger., 27 Entscheidungen des BGHSt 355, 359
(1978). This case introduces a "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine. (See infra notes 373-
38 1). In fact, the text of § 136a does not exclude "later statements" ("spi'tere Aussage"), but
the same statements first made under coercion and then made freely.
128. Wiretaps are permissible only on the suspicion of major crimes involving state secur-
ity, counterfeiting, kidnapping, extortion, murder, robbery, or weapons offenses. STPO
§ 100a, enacted Aug. 13, 1968, 1968 BGBI I 949, 951, amended May 31, 1978, 1978 BGB1 I
641, 645. See infra notes 376-77. Wiretaps permitted in this "catalogue" still require a war-
rant from a judge. STPO § 100b. See Carr, Wiretapping in West Germany, 29 AM. J. COMP.
L. 607 (1981).
129. Judgment of Mar. 17, 1983, BGHSt, W. Ger., 31 Entscheidungen des BGHSt 304
(1983), 3 NSTZ 466 (1983), 37 MONATSSCHRIFT FOR DEUTscHEs RECHT [MDR] 590 (1983),
36 NJW 1570 (1983), 39 JZ 386 (1984).
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police, since this would limit the accused's freedom of decision during
interrogation.130 STPO section 136a also has general implications for
other areas of criminal procedure. For example, plea bargaining could
never be legitimized by a German court since any confession to a lesser
crime that was induced by the promise of advantage would automatically
be inadmissible even if the accused were to consent to a guilty plea.1
3 '
In Germany, arbitrary prolongations of arrest and mistreatment of
suspects are no longer considered a problem. There would be little ad-
vantage in prolonging detention beyond the permitted twenty-four
hours1 32 because any statement obtained thereafter would be excluded
under section 136a. The introduction of this crucial passage in 1950 has
enabled German courts to improve the defendant's rights to a degree
unknown in France and Italy.
C. Italy
Because the Italian legislature has taken steps to assure the rights of
the accused at every stage of the criminal proceeding,133 Italy has pro-
duced little case law on due process violations.13 The explanation for
the small number of cases is that Italy has greatly restricted police
interrogation. 135
The restrictions on police interrogations were a belated reaction to
fascism. Reform of criminal procedure did not begin in Italy immedi-
ately after World War II because there were no occupation forces to help
maintain law and order. As a result, what the Germans feared would
happen if they did not adopt an exclusionary statute did happen in Italy:
suspects were grossly abused while in custody136 despite provisions in the
130. Judgment of Aug. 19, 1983, Oberlandesgericht [OLG], Dilsseldorf, 38 MDR 164
(1984).
131. Judgment of Sept. 14, 1965, BGHSt, W. Ger., 20 Entscheidungen des BGHSt 268
(1966); Judgment of Aug. 20, 1984, OLG, Hamm, 38 MDR 1043 (1984).
132. STPO § 128 stipulates the detainee must be brought before a judge (or released) "at
the latest, on the next day."
133. Since 1968, the Italian Constitutional Court has required that the rights of defendants
be protected at the police stage, as well as at the judicial stages of the investigation. Judgement
of July 5, 1968 No. 86, Corte Costituzionale [Corte cost.], Italy, 13 Giurisprudenza Costitu-
zionale [Giur. Cost.] 143 note P. Miletto (1968); Judgment of Dec. 3, 1969, No. 148, Corte
cost., Italy, 14 Giur. Cost. 2249 note E. Amodio (1969).
134. Judgment of April 14, 1970, Corte app., Rome, 125 Giur. Ital. II 244, 254 (1973).
135. C.P.P. art. 225, para 2 (Italy), Law of Oct. 14, 1974, n. 497, art. 7, 1974 Gaz. Uff.
1988. See infra notes 164-67 and accompanying text.
136. Scaparone, Police Interrogation in Italy, 1974 CRIM L. REv. 581. Carnelutti, A pro-
posito di tortura, 6 RIvISTA DI DmIiTro PROCESSUALE [RIv. DIR. PRO.] 237 (1952). Voena,
Interrogatorio di polizia e principio di uguaglianza, 19 Giur. Cost. II 2214, 2218 n. 14 (1974).
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penal code137 and the Constitution13 designed to protect detainees.
Italy was not subjected to foreign occupation for two reasons: first,
its citizens had played a large role in their own liberation; and second,
human rights violations by Italian Fascists were comparatively benign.
After the invasion of Sicily in July 1943, the Allies attempted to establish
an Allied Military Government but lacked sufficient manpower.
139
Moreover, as a result of the cooperation of Partisan forces in the libera-
tion of Italy, I"' the Allies decided that an occupation government was
unnecessary 141 because many Italians were anxious to assist in the over-
throw of the fascist regime. These Partisans became a uniting force to
Italians from all political groups, and under the impetus of this spirit of
unity, the Italian monarchy was replaced by the Italian Republic, and the
liberal Constitution of 1948 was established.
Italy emerged from World War II scarred but with its legal institu-
137. CODICE PENALE [C.P.] art. 608, Law of Oct. 19, 1930, n. 1398, 1930 Gaz. Uff. 773,
prohibits officials from resorting to "measures of severity not permitted by law" against detain-
ees, on penalty of confinement for up to 30 months.
138. COSTITUZIONE art. 13 prohibits "[a]ny physical or moral violence against persons
whose liberty is restricted."
139. N. KOGAN, ITALY AND THE ALLIES 43 (1956). The original title A.M.G.O.T. (Allied
Military Government Occupied Territory) was shortened to A.M.G.
140. Id. at 71. D.M. SMITH, ITALY 482 (1959). H.S. HUGHES, THE UNITED STATES AND
ITALY 132 (3d ed. 1979). M. CAPPELLETrI, J.H. MERRYMAN & J.M. PERILLO, THE ITALIAN
LEGAL SYSTEM 54 (1967).
141. The willingness of the Allies to grant Italy internal sovereignty immediately after the
war (see G. MAMMARELLA, ITALY AFTER FASCISM: A POLITICAL HISTORY 1943-1965, at
159 (1960)) was also due to the fact that human rights violations in Italy never reached the
nadir that they did in Germany, even though fascism began in Italy. The major institutions
and tactics of Italian fascism were the following: (1) The black-shirted Action Squads
(Squadristi; (2) the special police (inspectorate or political police force founded by Arturo
Bocchini in September 1926, known as O.R.V.A. after 1927. See E. WISKEMANN, FASCISM IN
ITALY 19 (2d ed. 1970); C. DELZELL, MUSSOLINI's ENEMIES 38-39 (1961)); (3) special courts
(the Tribunale Speciale per la Difesa dello Stato founded Feb. 1, 1927, staffed by non-jurists);
(4) deportation to ari island (confino di polizia, five years was the harshest penalty of the
Tribunali speciali. C. DELZELL, supra, at 38); (5) the hysterical manipulation of crowds;
(6) the military organization of youth; (7) political prisons; and (8) the Roman salute (report-
edly invented by the director of an early silent film, L. BARZINI, THE IMPOSSIBLE EUROPEANS
88 (1983)). Italian fascism served as a model for the brown-shirted Storm Troopers, the Ge-
stapo, People's Courts, the Hitler Youth (Hitleriugend), the Nazi rallies, and the concentration
camps. D.M. SMITH, supra note 140, at 478. E. WISKEMANN, supra, at 19, 94, 98. But Italian
police forces (Carabinieri) were not entirely subservient to the Fascist government; many re-
mained loyal to the Italian King, Victor Emmanuel II, who retained some power under Mus-
solini. Fifteen hundred of these loyal carabinieri were deported. M. MICHAELIS, MUSSOLINI
AND THE JEwS 384, 387, 405 (1978). C. DELZELL, supra, at 275. Also, Italian courts, unlike
those in Germany, never completely succumbed to fascism. M. BERLINGUER, LA CRISI
DELLA GIUSTIZIA NEL REGIME FASCISTA (Rome 1944), cited in C. DELZELL, supra, at 39
n.l 17, 54. E. WISKEMANN, supra, at 20, 83.
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tions intact. Having experienced eighteen months of civil war between
the Allied-equipped Partisans and German-backed Fascists, Italy was de-
pendent on its own police 42 and judiciary to restore order and punish
criminals and collaborators. The Christian Democratic leader, Alcide
De Gaspari, officially turned punishment of Fascists over to the ordinary
courts on January 1, 1945.141 Police techniques, however, could not be
reformed immediately. In fact, many Fascist police laws remained on
the books until abrogated a decade later by the Italian Constitutional
Court'" and the reforms of the 1950's.
14 1
Exclusion, at first, pliyed no role in post-War criminal procedure.
Some considered it absurd to treat relevant evidence as juridically non-
existent. 146 This position was restated by the Court of Cassation in 1957,
when it refused to exclude a coerced confession. 147 In 1960 an eminent
Italian criminal proceduralist, Franco Cordero, took issue with the con-
cept of exclusion which he observed in French, German, and United
States law.148 Cordero believed that exclusion would lead to a tyranny of
procedural technicalities. Even as Cordero wrote, however, there was
reason to consider police behavior in the production of evidence. Be-
cause of a marked swing to the political right in 1960, Italian democracy
was threatened. 149 In reaction, Italian courts for the first time began to
apply penal sanctions to police officers who obtained confessions through
force150 and who carried out illegal searches and seizures."' Today,
criminal prosecution is still available for gross police abuses;' 52 however,
since the introduction of exclusion for due process violations, omission of
142. C. DELZELL, supra note 141, at 509.
143. N. KOGAN, A POLITICAL HISTORY OF POSTWAR ITALY 35 (1966). Judgments of
Nov. 13, 1944, and April 30, 1945, Corte cass., Italy, 69 Foro Italiano [Foro It.] II 128 (1946);
Judgment of Mar. 4, 1947, Corte cass., Italy, 70 Foro It. 11 139 (1947); Judgment of June 26,
1948, Corte cass., Italy, 72 Foro It. II 8 (1949).
144. See, e.g., Judgment of July 3, 1956, Corte cost., Italy, 79 Foro It. 1 1038 (1956).
145. Reformers attempted to restrict unjustified searches and seizures and the duration of
pre-trial detention in 1953. La Riforma del Codice di Procedura Penale, 79 RIv. PEN. 569,
595, 602 (1954).
146. Ricca, La perquisizioni di Polizia Giurdiziari nelleproposte di modificazione del Codice
PP, 78 RIv. PEN. 187, 188 (1953).
147. Judgment of Dec. 14, 1957, Corte cass., Italy, 1 RIv. IT. DIR. PRO. PEN. 564 (1958).
See supra note 28.
148. Cordero, Prove illecite nelprocesso penale, 4 Riv. IT. DIR. PRO. PEN. 32 (1961).
149. H.S. HUGHES, supra note 140, at 213; D.M. SMITH, supra note 140, at 498.
150. Judgment of Dec. 17, 1960, Corte cass., Italy, 84 Foro It. 11 105 (1961).
151. Judgment of Dec. 10, 1960, Tribunale [Trib.], Benevento, 113 Giur. Ital. II 144
(1961). See infra text accompanying note 360. In the United States, punishment of police
officers has been suggested as an alternative to exclusion in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 415 (1971) (Burger, C.J. dissenting).
152. See, e.g., Judgment of Oct. 11, 1982, Corte cass., Italy, 109 RIV. PEN. 495 (1983).
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right to silence warnings, and search and seizure violations, no criminal
actions against the police have been reported. One inference that can be
drawn is that Italy has decided it is more efficient to exclude evidence
than to prosecute the police.
Exclusion was made possible by two far-reaching decisions of the
Italian Constitutional Court. 1 5 3 In contrast to the French Conseil consti-
tutionnel, which has the power to examine the conformity of legislation
with the French Constitution before promulgation,154 the Italian Consti-
tutional Court has had powers of judicial review since 1956;155 it is em-
powered to review actual cases. 156 The Court's purpose is to supplement
the more conservative, technically-oriented Italian judiciary with a body
of judges atuned to the values of the liberal Constitution of 1948.157 The
Court's 1968 and 1969 decisions, guided by Italian legal scholarship of
the 1960's, held that the suspect's constitutional rights, including the
right to counsel, had to be respected in the police investigative stage as
well as in the judicial stage of criminal proceedings. 58
The Rome Court of Appeals reacted immediately to these two deci-
sions by excluding evidence based on a due process violation.159 Since
1970, however, no due process cases have been reported.16° The Italian
legislature, encouraged by the Constitutional Court's 1968 and 1969 de-
cisions, has severely limited the authority of the police to interrogate
153. See supra note 133.
154. CONSTITUTION OF OCT. 4, 1958, art. 61 (France), DALLOZ, RtPERTOIRE DU DROIT
PUBLIC ET ADMINISTRATIF: CONSTITUTION ET POUVOIRS PUBLICS (1976), reprinted in 0.
KAHN-FREUND, C. LtvY & B. RUDDEN, supra note 39, at 18.
155. COSTrrUzIONE art. 134 (Italy).
156. Cappelletti & Adams, Judicial Review of Legislation, 79 HARV. L. REv. 1207, 1218
(1966).
157. M. CAPPELLETTI, J.H. MERRYMAN & J.M. PERILLO, supra note 140; at 57 (1967).
Trocker, JudicialResponsibility in Italy, in ASsOCIAZIONE ITALIANA DI DIRrITO COMPARATO:
ITALIAN NATIONAL REPORTS TO THE XITH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF COMPARATIVE
LAW 217 (1982).
158. See literature cited in notes of P. Miletto and E. Amodio to Judgments of July 5, 1968
and Dec. 3, 1969, cited supra note 133, and De Maestri, Inesistenza giuridica della confessione
estorta, 125 Giur. Ital. II 244 (1973).
159. Judgment of April 14, 1970, Corte app., Rome, 125 Giur. Ital. II 244, 254 (1973):
[I]f the trial court did not deepen its inquiry concerning this procedural outcome of
unquestioned seriousness, this court has the duty to affirm that a judge cannot and
must not, in order to influence his [free] conviction [of the evidence] in any way, as to
the guilt of the accused person, make use of statements- whether true or not-
which are the fruit of physical or moral violence. This is prohibited not so much by
the law, but rather by the Constitution and the rules which ought to control a demo-
cratic government such as that of our Republic.
In American terms this is the rationale of judicial integrity.
160. Allegations of police "torture" are now considered newsworthy. See CORRIERE
DELLA SERA, March 23, 1982, at 1.
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prisoners. In 1969 the legislature attempted to prohibit police from in-
terrogating arrested suspects; 16 1 however, Italian police continued to in-
terrogate suspects to obtain "spontaneous statements," which the Court
of Cassation held admissible in 1971162 and 1974.163
Today, exclusion plays a central role in Italian law in controlling
police interrogations. After 1974, the judicial police were no longer per-
mitted to conduct a formal interrogation of a suspect unless the suspect's
attorney was present."6  The inadmissibility of statements-though not
of all evidence-obtained through a police interrogation is now firmly
established in Italian law. 165 To enable the police to collect essential in-
formation, police were permitted, after 1978, to make "summary inquir-
ies" (sommarie informazioni)'66 in the absence of the suspect's attorney.
But the statements obtained through "summary inquiries" may not be
included in the suspect's dossier or referred to in testimony.
167
III. EXCLUSION FOR FAILURE TO WARN OF THE
RIGHT TO SILENCE
The suspect's right to refuse to answer the questions of police inves-
tigators is a basic premise of European, as well as Anglo-American law.
The right to silence is derived from the older notion of the right against
self-incrimination, first mentioned by the medieval theologian St. John
Chrysostom I68 and included in Gratian's Decretum 169 and medieval legal
161. Law of Dec. 5, 1969, n.932, 1969 Gaz. Uff. 941, formerly C.P.P. art 225 para. 2,
modified by the Law of March 18, 1971, n.62, art. 3, 1971 Gaz. Uff. 650, altered by the Law of
Oct. 22, 1974, n.275, art. 7, 1974 Gaz. Uff. 1988.
162. Judgment of Aug. 25, 1971, Corte cass., Italy, 125 Giur. Ital. 11 113 (1973) (with
note).
163. Judgment of May 15, 1974, Corte cass., Italy, 128 Giur. Ital. II 70 note E. Rubiola
(1976).
164. C.P.P. art. 225 para. 2, Law of Oct. 14, 1974, n.497, art. 7, 1974 Gaz. Uff. 1988.
165. Judgment of April 17, 1978, Corte cass., Italy, 132 Giur. Ital. II 219, text accompany-
ing note 3 (1980).
166. C.P.P. art. 225-bis., Law of March 21, 1978, n.59, art. 5, 1978 Gaz. Uff. 331. See
generally Grevi, "Sommarie informazioni" dipolizia e diritto di difesa dell'indiziato nel nuovo
art. 225-his C.p.p., 22 RiV. DIR. PRO. PEN. 58, 83 (1979). Some objected that investigators
would use "summary inquiries" to acquire evidence other than statements from the accused.
See infra note 167.
167. In the Judgment of April 19, 1978, Corte cass., Italy, 132 Giur. Ital. II 219, 222
(1980), however, the court said, "no one has ever doubted that elements can emerge from
declarations [in a summary inquiry] for or against the accused."
168. CHRYSOSTOMUS, HOMILIAE IN EPISTULAM AD HEBRAEOS 31.3, in 63 MIGNE, PA-
TROLOGIAE GRAECAE 213, 216 (1862), cited in Riesenfeld, Law Making and Legislative Prece-
dent in American Legal History, 33 MINN. L. REV. 103, 118 n.80 (1949).
169. GRATIAN, DECRETUM 2D PART. CAUSA 33, Qu 3 (de poenitentia) 87, 1 CORPUS
IURIS CANONICI 1184 (E. Friedberg ed. 1879), cited in Riesenfeld, supra note 168, at 118 n.81.
[Vol. 9
Exclusionary Rules
commentaries.170 The right against self-incrimination was adopted in
England for all courts about 1660 and in the United States by the fifth
amendment to the Constitution.
17 1
In Miranda v. Arizona,172 the United States Supreme Court inter-
preted the constitutional right against self-incrimination to include the
right to remain silent during police interrogation. Since Miranda, United
States law has required that, upon arrest, police inform suspects of their
rights to remain silent and to counsel. 17 3 In France, an 1897 statute re-
quired that a suspect receive a right to silence warning at the first appear-
ance before a magistrate.1 74 In Germany, according to a law of 1877,175
the suspect was asked to respond to charges at the first judicial hearing.
In 1913, the Italian Legislature rejected the requirement of a right to
silence warning at a suspect's first appearance before a magistrate.
176
The idea of requiring the police, as well as the judiciary, to warn
suspects of the right to silence is a post-War development. Modern laws
concerning exclusion for failure to warn of the right to silence can be
summarized as follows:
170. HosTIENSIs, DECRETALIUM COMMENTARIA X 2.18.2 "Cum super" fol. 72ra § 3
(Venice 1581 rep. Turin 1965). Cf Connery, The Right to Silence, 39 MARQ. L. REV. 180
(1955-1956).
171. U.S. CONST. amend. V: "No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be
a witness against himself." See generally 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2250, at 277-90 (Mc-
Naughton rev. 19i61); L.W. LEvY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFrH AMENDMENT (1968).
172. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Experience has shown that unless a suspect
is informed of the right to remain silent, the right is rarely exercised. Almost invariably, sus-
pects believe they are required to rerpond to investigators and that questioning can continue
until they have responded. Id. at 468. See Ackermann, Garanties de !a defense pendant la
procddure preliminaire, 24 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT PtNAL 71, 87 (1953).
173. 384 U.S. at 468.
174. Law of Dec. 8, 1897, art. 3, 1897 D.P. IV 119. "At this first appearance, the magis-
trate will ascertain the identity of the accused, inform him of the crimes attributed to him, and
receive his statements, after having warned him that he is free not to make any." This is the
basis of C. PR. PlaN. art. 114 (1958).
175. STPO § 136 (Feb. 1, 1877, 1877 RGB1 278, Ger.) ("The accused is to be asked
whether he wishes to respond to charges.").
176. C.P.P. art. 261 (Italy, 1913) required that "the investigating magistrate request that
the accused defend himself and present evidence in his favor, warning him that even if he did
not respond the inquiry would proceed anyway." Proposals for a clear-cut warning of the
suspect's right not to respond were defeated in the Italian Parliament. Grevi, Considerazioni
preliminari sul diritto al silenzio dell'imputato nel "nuovo" 3* comma dell Art. 78 C.p.p., 13
REV. IT. DIR. PRO. PEN. 1119, 1122 nn.8 et seq. (1970).
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EXCLUSION FOR OMISSION OF RIGHT TO SILENCE WARNING
Interrogator FRANCE GERMANY ITALY
Police yes 177  discretionary 7 ' (not applicable)
179
Investigating yes' 80  undecided 1
8 1 yes182
Magistrate
Trial no 183 yes 18 4  no 185
Neither the United States nor the European countries have proposed
that exclusion for failure to warn be replaced by an alternate remedy
such as disciplining the police. Since no alternative to exclusion has been
suggested, the question has become whether, rather than how, to punish
omissions. In this debate, United States and European law begin with
opposite premises. Critics of the United States exclusionary rule argue
that the Constitution does not require a right to silence warning by the
177. C. PR. PIEN. art. 105 (Law of Feb. 13, 1960).
178. STPO § 163aIV requires police to give a § 136 right to silence warning. In its
Judgment of June 7, 1983, BGHSt, W. Ger., 31 Entscheidungen des BGHSt 395 (1983), 3
NStZ 565 (1983), 38 JZ 716 (1983), the BGH held that an unintentional omission was not
grounds for automatic exclusion. For further discussion of this case, see infra note 218.
179. C.P.P. art. 78.3 (Law of Dec. 5, 1969, n.932 Art. 3, 1969 Gaz. Uff. 941). This section
applies only to non-arrested suspects. The judicial police are forbidden to interrogate arrested
suspects except in cases of "necessity and urgency," C.P.P. art. 225 bis. Since art. 225 bis
forbids such statements to be used on pain of nullity, a warning would be irrelevant. See supra
notes 166-67.
180. C. PR. PtN. arts. 105, 114. See infra notes 191-206.
181. Judgment of May 14, 1974, BGHSt, W. Ger., 25 Entscheidungen des BGHSt 325,
331, 27 NJW 1570, 1571 (1974). The main functions of the German pretrial magistrate, the
Ermittlungsrichter, include interviewing witnesses, and were extended to public prosecutors in
the 1975 revisions of the STPO, STPO § 160, Jan. 7, 1975, 1975 BGBI 129, 160. The role of
the Ermittlungsrichter was thereby greatly reduced. Lampe, Ermittlungszustdndigkeit von
Richter und Staatsanwalt nach den L St. VRG, 28 NJW 195 (1975).
182. C.P.P. art. 78.3. See Judgment of July 7, 1970, Corte app., Florence, 123 Giur. Ital. II
359 (1971); Judgment of Jan. 11, 1971, Corte cass., Italy, 124 Giur. Ital. II 238 (1972);
Judgment of April 2, 1971, Trib., Bologna, 123 Giur. Ital. II 364 (1971), Judgment of Feb. 9,
1979, Corte cass., Italy, 132 Giur. Ital. II 324 (1980).
183. C. PR. PfaN. art. 328. There is no right to silence during the trial in France. The
accused may not refuse to take the stand and inferences may be drawn from silence. 2 R.
MERLE & A. VITU, supra note 52, at 718.
184. STPO § 243; Judgment of May 14, 1974, BGHSt, W. Ger., 25 Entscheidungen des
BGHSt 325, 331 (1975) (Omission of warning required by STPO § 243 IV is appealable error if
warning was necessary to inform the accused of his or her defense possibilities, and he or she
would have refused to make a declaration on the matter.)
185. Judgment of Feb. 9, 1971, Corte cass., Italy, 124 Giur. Ital. 11 192 (1972) (second
warning not required if warning was given at an earlier stage). Negative inferences may not be
drawn from exercising the "right to silence" during police inquiries. Judgment of Feb. 9, 1979,
Corte cass., Italy, 132 Giur. Ital. II 324 (1980). Negative inferences, however, may be drawn
by the trial judge from silence in conjunction with "mendacious behavior." Judgment of Mar.
2, 1984, Corte cass., Italy, 110 RIv. PEN. 977 (1984).
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police and that the warning requirement has placed a substantial burden
on local law enforcement efforts.
1 8 6
European Codes expressly require a right to silence warning, but
scholars and courts have debated whether this statutory right should be
enforced. Legal scholars in France, Italy, and Germany favor exclusion
to enforce the relevant Code provisions."8 7 French courts require exclu-
sion for intentional omissions,18 8 but permit a good faith exception. Ger-
man law now allows exclusion even when the omission was
unintentional.1 8 9 Italian law requires exclusion and employs a fruit of
the poisonous tree doctrine to prevent admission of evidence derived
from illegally obtained statements.190
A. France
Since 1897, French law has required that suspects charged with a
crime be warned of their rights to silence and counsel at the first appear-
ance before a magistrate. 191 Under the 1958 Code of Criminal Proce-
dure, the juge d'instruction must inform the suspect of the, charges
against him or her, and warn of the rights to silence and counsel.
192
Statements by a suspect who wishes to proceed without counsel, or
whose counsel fails to appear, are admissible.
1 93
In Fesch, a 1955 decision, a decade before Miranda, the Court of
Cassation attempted to extend similar rights to uncharged suspects held
for police interrogation.1 94 Before 1955, French law required that a right
to silence warning be given only to those actually charged with a crime.
No warning was required for those detained as "voluntary" witnesses
1 95
186. See, e.g., New York v. Quarles, 104 S. Ct. 2626, 2635 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
187. See infra notes 201 & 218 (France), 216 & 218 (Germany).
188. Judgment of Feb. 13, 1975, Cass. crim., Fr., 1977 J.C.P. II No. 18727, erratum II No.
18746 bis.
189. See infra note 219.
190. Cf E. Rubiola, Inutilizzabilitd delle dichiarazioni rese dall'indiziato prima di essere
divenuto tale, 127 Giur. Ital. II 431 (1975).
191. Law of Dec. 8, 1897, art. 3, 1897 D.P. IV 119 (warning); Judgment of Feb. 4, 1898,
Cass. crim., Fr., 1898 D.P. I 229 (nullity for failure ofjuge d'instruction to advise of right to
counsel).
192. The relevant statute in current law is C. PR. PPN. art. 114. Judgment of Mar. 14,
1974, Cass. crim., Fr., 1974 D.S. Jur. 604 note J.M. Robert.
193. 2 R. MERLE & A. Vrru, supra note 52, § 1172, at 432.
194. Judgment of June 16, 1955 (Fesch), Cass. crim., Fr., 1955 J.C.P. II No. 8851 note R.
Vouin.
195. See supra note 67. In Fesch, supra note 194, the Court of Cassation attempted to
protect the rights of witnesses held for questioning by the juge d'instruction or by judicial
police acting on a letter rogatory issued by ajuge d'instruction. See infra note 207.
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or arrested en flagrant dilit and held for questioning.1 96 Thus, through
the technique of delayed charging (inculpation tardive), the police or a
magistrate could continue to interrogate a suspect without giving a right
to silence warning. In Fesch, the Court of Cassation required exclusion if
the delay "had the result of evading the protections guaranteed by the
Law of 1897." 197 The Fesch decision precipitated a storm of police pro-
test. After much debate, in 1960 the French Assembly replaced the
Fesch rule with article 105 of the Code de procddure pdnale, which set
forth a good faith test and required exclusion only for intentional delays
in indictments. 98
French police have vigorously opposed, as an interference with ef-
fective investigative methods, 199 administration of the right to silence
warning200 and the Fesch exclusionary rule, even as transformed by the
1960 statute. For different reasons, legal scholars also oppose the subjec-
tive standard set forth in the 1960 statute. They argue that limiting ex-
clusion to bad faith violations is an unwise accommodation to the police,
made at the expense of the "rights of the defense" guaranteed to all sus-
pects. One scholar, Professor Vouin, argues for a return to the objective
Fesch standard which required exclusion based on the "result" rather
than the "intent" of the officer.20 1
The Court of Cassation has enforced the 1960 statute and has used
196. See supra note 66.
197. In Fesch, supra note 194, the exclusion took the form of nullifying the procedure from
the moment of the first illegal interrogation.
198. For a discussion of the legislative history of C. PR. PfN. art. 105, see Lambert,
L'article 105 du Code deprocddurepdnale, 93 Gaz. Pal. II 583 (1973). See also Judgment of
Feb. 13, 1975, Cass. crim., Fr., 1977 J.C.P. II No. 18727 note A. Mayer-Jack; Vouin, Le
malheureux article 105, 1974 D.S. Chronique 1. The text of C. PR. PAN. art. 105 reads: "The
juge d'instruction in charge of a preliminary investigation as well as the magistrates and officers
of the judicial police acting under a rogatory commission, may not, with the intention of frus-
trating the rights of the defense, hear as witnesses, persons against whom there exists serious
evidence indicating guilt."
199. Lambert, L'article 105 du Code deprocddurepdnale, 93 GAZ. PAL. II 583, 587 (1973).
Lambert. opines that art. 105 requires the police to inculpate innocent parties. While some
alternative to premature charging may be desirable, see Jonqu6res, Inculpation et mise en
cause, 93 Gaz. Pal. 11461 (1973), this would not seem to justify the judicial police intentionally
delaying charging when there is clear evidence of guilt.
200. A typical art. 105 warning provides:
We hereby warn you that in the present state of the inquiry, serious and consistent
evidence of guilt has been found against you. As required by art. 105 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, which we now read to you, we are breaking off this interroga-
tion and we are going to bring you before thejuge d'instruction.
Quoted in A. Mayer-Jack, note on Judgment of Feb. 13, 1975, Cass. crim., Fr., 1977 J.C.P. II
No. 18727 at II. The police cannot avoid this protection by testifying orally about statements
later annulled. Judgment of June 30, 1981, Cass. crim., Fr., 1981 J.C.P. IV No. 341.
201. Vouin, supra note 198, at 2.
[V/ol. 9
Exclusionary Rules
exclusion for bad faith omissions of the right to silence warning after-a
formal inquiry has been opened. The Court has refused, however, to ex-
clude statements obtained by the judicial police before a formal inquiry,
even if the police intentionally delayed charging to avoid a right to si-
lence warning. 02 This double standard has been criticized by legal
scholars.20 3 Moreover, scholars argue that abuses will continue because
of the preponderant role of the judicial police in screening cases before
they reach the public prosecutor or the juge d'instruction. Reformers,
therefore, continue to argue for a complete separation of the administra-
tive and the judicial police, with the latter under the control of the state
attorney and the Ministry of Justice as was done in Belgium.2°
In summary, the right to silence warning in France differs from the
United States Miranda warning in several respects. First, the warning
need not be given to detainees during a preliminary inquiry before an
official investigation by the prosecutor begins. Second, even if an inquiry
has begun, thejuge d'instruction or the judicial police need not adminis-
ter a right to silence warning unless they believe they have a strong case
against the suspect. Third, the warning constitutes a decisive break, and
statements following the warning cannot be admitted into evidence.2"5
French and United States procedure are similar as both countries
use exclusion to ensure that a suspect is informed of his or her rights.
While French courts have not explicitly stated that deterrence is the ra-
tionale behind article 105, the 1960 statute is clearly aimed at police con-
duct. It seems apparent that French police would not be so opposed to
article 105 exclusion if it did not interfere with their conduct.20 6
B. Germany
The right to silence warning has long been part of German law, at
least in theory. Originally, however, a warning was required only in lim-
ited circumstances. The Code of Criminal Procedure of 1877 required
202. Judgment of July 27, 1964, Cass. crim., Fr., 1964 J.C.P. II No. 13941 note M. Le
Clare. The formal inquiry (Information) begins when the case is referred to a juge
d'instruction. C. PR. PAN. arts. 79 et seq. (Fr. 1958).
203. See, ag., 2 R. MERLE & A. VITu, supra note 52, § 1180 at 442 n.1. G. STEFANI, G.
LEVASSEUR & B. BOULOC, PRECIS DALLOZ DE PROCfDURE PfNALE 481 n. 1 (1 1th ed. 1980).
204. Grebing, supra note 56, at 33.
205. Statements obtained after the warning has been given are excluded. This does not
affect the admissibility of statements made before the warning if the charging was not inten-
tionally delayed to deprive the suspect of the rights of defense. Judgment of June 16, 1981,
Cass. crim., Fr., 1983 D.S.I.R. 76.
206. Hence this author disagrees with Weinreb's conclusion: "the exclusion of evidence is
not applied as a remedy for police misconduct in France as it is here." Langbein & Weinreb,
Continental Criminal Procedure: Myth and Reality, 87 YALE L.J. 1549, 1554 (1978).
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that a judge warn a suspect of the right to silence, but did not require a
warning from the police or prosecutor. The 1877 provision, applicable at
the first judicial interrogation of the suspect, provided that "[t]he accused
is to be asked whether he wishes to respond to charges."' 0 7 This proce-
dure, like the Italian one, did not necessarily convey that the suspect was
free not to respond. 0 8 In 1964, however, the legislature, inspired by
French law, rewrote the provision to require that the accused be in-
formed of the right to remain silent and the right to legal counsel at the
first judicial hearing. 0 9 Additionally, a provision was enacted which
also required the public prosecutor and the police to warn suspects of
their rights. l0
At first, these code sections were considered advisory rather than
mandatory. In 1968 the BGH held that because the legislature did not
provide for exclusion for failure to warn, a lack of judicial compliance
would not automatically result in exclusion of an in-court confession. a
Legal scholars criticized the court's interpretation of the Code of Crimi-
212nal Procedure, arguing that the legislature's intent was to provide the
accused with a choice not to speak. If the warning was not mandatory,
and failure to warn did not result in exclusion, scholars contended that
choice was removed and due process (rechtsstaatliche Strafrerfahren)
violated.
In 1974 the BGH accepted these arguments and held that the right
to silence warning was mandatory for the judicial phase of the proceed-
ings. 2 3 The court reasoned that the legislature's purpose was to ensure
207. STPO § 136 (Feb. 1, 1877, 1877 RGBI 278).
208. See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
209. STPO § 136 (I) (modified Dec. 19, 1964, 1964 BGBlI 1067):
At the beginning of the first hearing the accused is to be told what crime he is ac-
cused of and what criminal statutes are involved. He is to be warned that under the
law, he is free to respond to the charges or to say nothing concerning the matter, and
at any time, even before his hearing, to consult with defense counsel of his choice.
Id. French influence is recognized in the Judgment of May 14, 1974, BGHSt, W. Ger., 25
Entscheidungen des BGHSt 325, 330 (1975) (citing C. PR. PPaN. art. 114).
210. STPO § 163a IV: "At the first hearing of the accused by police officers, the accused is
to be informed what acts he is accused of. In addition, at the hearing by police officers § 136 I
(2-4), II and III and § 136a shall apply."
211. Judgment of May 31, 1968, BGHSt, W. Ger., 22 Entscheidungen des BGHSt 170, 175
(1969).
212. See Griinwald, Beweisverbote und Verwertungsverbote im Strafverfahren, 21 JZ 489,
495 (1966); Griinwald, Comment on Judgment of April 30, 1968 [22 Entscheidungen des
BGHSt 129 (1969)] (STPO § 163a violation), 23 JZ 750, 752 (1968).
213. "To treat the requirements of STPO § 136 1(2) and § 243 IV(l) as mere regulations
['Ordnungsbestimmungen'] does not comply with their meaning." Judgment of May 14, 1974,
BGHSt, W. Ger., 25 Entscheidungen des BGHSt 325, 327 (1975). For the idea that a fair trial
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a fair procedure as required by principles derived from the basic notion
of the Rechtsstaat. (The Rechtsstaat is a German constitutional principle
requiring the State to observe its own laws in the legislature and in the
courts.) To achieve this end, a judicial right to silence warning had to be
compulsory and backed by exclusion. The court did not hold that a fail-
ure to administer the required warning would result in exclusion in
every case, however. Statements would be excluded only when the omis-
sion affected the outcome; for example, where the accused was not repre-
sented by counsel.2 14
The BGH decision explicitly left open the question of omissions of
the right to silence warning before trial.21 Most commentators believe
that omissions during police interrogation should be treated in the same
manner as judicial omissions216 because the intent of the legislature was
to protect the suspect at all stages. Restricting the warning requirement
to the trial stage is illogical because once the police have ignored their
duty to warn the suspect of the right to silence, a subsequent judicial
warning may be a meaningless formality.
In 1983 the BGH considered the question of police warnings. Two
lower courts had excluded admissions made in response to a police in-
quiry in the suspect's home. 217 The BGH reversed, noting that the legis-
lature had not required exclusion for omission of a right to silence
warning by the police.218 The BGH held that although an unintentional
("rechtsstaatlichenfairen Verfahrens") requires giving the accused the right to decide whether
to remain silent, see id. at 330.
214. Several commentators attacked the limited scope of the decision, arguing that the
accused should be given an official warning at every procedural stage at which he or she testi-
fies. See, e.g., Fezer, Grundfidlle zum Verlesungs- und Verwertungsverbot im Strafprozess, 18
JURISTISCHE SCHULUNG [JUS] 104, 107 text accompanying note 46 (1978).
215. Judgment of May 14, 1974, BGHSt, W. Ger., 25 Entscheidungen des BGHSt 325, 331
(1975).
216. See K.H. GOSSEL, STRAFVERFAHRENSRECHT 189 (1977); H.-H. KOHNE, STRAF-
PROZESSLEHRE 313 (2d ed. 1982); C. ROxIN, STRAFVERFAHRENSRECHT 129, 133 (17th ed.
1982); see also BOH Justice K. Boujong in KARLSRUHER KOMMENTAR ZUR STRAFPROZES-
SORDNUNG § 136 Rdn. 27, at 419 (G. Pfeiffer ed. 1982). A simple solution for all countries
would be to imitate the example of the Institut fir Rechtsmedizin in Munich, (Frauenlobstr.
7a), where blood samples are taken when a person is suspected of drunk driving, and where the
text of STPO § 136 is posted in large letters. Photo in ADAC MOTORWELT 44 (March 1983).
Additional information kindly provided by Kriminaloberrat Kirchmann of the Munich
Polizeipr'sidium to Professor Claus Roxin, Juristische Fakultut, Munich.
217. Judgment of June 7, 1983, BGHSt, W. Ger., 31 Entscheidungun des BGHSt 395
(1983), 3 NStZ 565 (1983), 38 JZ 716, 717 critical note G. Griinwald (1983).
218. The BGH's reasoning has not been accepted without criticism. K. Meyer (Chief Jus-
tice, Kammergericht, Berlin) explained why exclusion was made explicit by the legislature for
STPO § 136a but not for § 136. According to Justice Meyer, it went without saying that
statements would be excluded if the accused objected to their use on the basis of a violation of
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omission219 by the police does not mandate exclusion, a trial judge has
the discretion to exclude. According to the court, "the trial judge is not
prevented from evaluating, especially critically, the circumstances and
the content of a statement made without the previous warning."220 Thus
a trial judge cannot be reversed for ignoring relevant evidence if that
evidence was received after an unintentionally omitted warning. Other
criteria for the exercise of judicial discretion have been left for future
development. In view of the BGH's concern for effective law enforce-
ment,2 ' German law would probably permit postponement of a warning
when public safety was at risk.2"2 Despite the caution of the BGH deci-
sion,223 the trend in Germany appears to favor exclusion. German schol-
ars have been highly critical of the BGH's reluctance in this decision to
enforce the STPO warning requirements.224 In view of the authority
which scholarly law carries in Germany, it is reasonable to infer that
when an omission has been intentional or occurs after an arrest, lower
courts, and ultimately the BGH, will require exclusion to give effect to
Code provisions requiring a right to silence warning by the police.
C. Italy
To protect the privilege against self-incrimination,22 ' Italy requires a
right to silence warning at every stage of the criminal procedure.226
Although arrested suspects should not be interrogated by the police at
§ 136 or § 136a. Exclusion was made explicit in § 136a to prevent the admission of involun-
tary statements when the accused later agreed, or appeared to agree, to their use. 3 NSTZ 566,
567 (1983).
219. The BGH has left open the necessity of exclusion for omissions of the warning. It
seems likely that if the warning were omitted after an arrest, the omission would not be consid-
ered "unintentional."
220. Judgment of June 7, 1983, BGHSt, W. Ger., 31 Entscheidungen des BGHSt 395, 400
(1983), 3 NSTZ 566 (1983).
221. Id.
222. Cf New York v. Quarles, 104 S. Ct. 2626 (1984) (public safety exception for omission
of Miranda warning).
223. Under the facts of the Judgement of June 7, 1983, BGHSt, W. Ger., 31 En't-
scheidungen des BGHSt 395, 396 (1983), German police observed that a man was driving a car
erratically. The owner of the vehicle was traced and interviewed in his home shortly thereaf-
ter, where he admitted having driven the car. Even on these facts, where there was neither an
arrest nor custody, the trial and the lower appellate court favored exclusion of the suspect's
admission.
224. C. RoxIN, STRAFVERFAHRENSRECHT 142-43 (19th ed. 1985). See Griinwald, supra
note 217; Meyer, supra note 218.
225. Scaparone & Secci, Right to Silence in Italian Criminal Procedure, NINTH INTERNA-
TIONAL CONGRESS ON COMPARATIVE LAW, held inTehran 1974, ITALIAN NATIONAL RE-
PORTS 683 (Milan 1974).
226. See supra notes 134-35.
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length, a suspect who is summoned rather than arrested may be ques-
tioned on the theory that coercion is less likely to occur.2 2 ' Nevertheless,
even the summoned suspect is given the rights to counsel22 and to re-
main silent.229 A witness need not receive a warning; however, in Italy'
there is less incentive than in France to delay charging230 to obtai state-
ments without having to inform a suspect of his or her rights to counsel
and to remain silent, 31 because the courts treat statements obtained
before the warning as "unusable in any way. 
''32
The extent of the exclusion required by the words "unusable in any
way" must be interpreted in light of Italy's strong "fruit of the poisonous
tree" doctrine.2 33 The current view is that all evidence derived from un-
lawfully obtained statements is inadmissible.234 Italian courts require ex-
clusion of derived evidence not only for statements obtained from
witnesses before administration of a right to silence warning2 35 but also
for other types of illegally obtained evidence.
2 36
IV. SEARCH AND SEIZURE VIOLATIONS
No aspect of the exclusionary rule has aroused more opposition in
the United States than its use for search and seizure violations and illegal
wiretaps. In recent years, the Burger Court has repeatedly restricted the
application of the exclusionary rule. Despite the distinct histories and
social needs of the countries under discussion, there has been remarkable
convergence in recent years in the development of exclusionary rules re-
227. For a description of the law before the 1978 modifications, see Scaparone, supra note
136, at 582. See also supra notes 166, 179.
228. C.P.P.. art. 78.3.
229. Judgment of Nov. 3, 1971, Corte. cass., Italy, 1972 Cassazione penale Massimario
annotato 1673, no. 2552, cited in Scaparone, supra note 136, at 582 n.7.
230. In Italy, unlike in France (see supra notes 199-203), there has been scarcely any dis-
cussion of declarations made before charging. This author was able to find only a single case
note: Rubiola, Inutilizzabilitd delle dichiarazioni rese dall'indiziato prima di essere divenuto
tale, 127 Giur. Ital. II 431 (1975).
231. C.P.P. art. 304.3.
232. Judgment of Feb. 20, 1974, Corte cass., Italy, 127 Giur. Ital. 11432, 436 (197-5); Judg-
ment of Feb. 9, 1979, Corte cass., Italy, 132 Giur. Ital. II 324 (1980).
233. Rubiola, supra note 230, at 436.
234. V. GREVJ, NEMO TENETUR SE DETEGERE 195 (1972). The older view of Cordero,
supra note 140, at 54, rejecting exclusion for derived evidence, has been abandoned.
235. Judgment of Feb. 20, 1974, Corte cass., Italy, 127 Giur. Ital. 11432 (1975); Judgment
of Feb. 9, 1979, Corte cass., Italy, 132 Giur. Ital. II 324 (1980) (entire procedure not to be
nullified).
236. Judgment of Sept. 12, 1973, Trib., Milan, Giudice Istruttore, 100 Riv. PEN. 894
(1974) (search and seizure); Judgment of July 14, 1983, Corte cass., Italy, 110 Riv. PEN. 87
(1984) (wiretapping). See infra notes 382-92 and accompanying text.
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lating to search and seizure violations. Clearly, the rule is not unique to
the United States. In France, where freedom of expression has remained
relatively intact, the main focus of the courts since the Revolution of
1789 has been the protection of the domicile.23 7 German law has focused
on privacy of communication and thought.23 Developments in these
two countries have been very gradual, beginning in France with minor
crimes, and in Germany with civil cases. By contrast, exclusion came to
Italy as a "legal transplant." '39 Although it was unknown in that coun-
try before 1970, it was accepted in one decade by the courts, legislature,
and scholars for even the most serious crimes.
While France, Germany, and Italy exclude evidence obtained
through illegal searches, each country has reached this result in its own
way. France has relied on its own traditions, while Germany and Italy
have developed exclusionary rules based on their constitutions.
A. France
1. Search and Seizure
The sanctity of the domicile has been protected in France since the
French Revolution.2'4  Today, in theory, strict penal sanctions apply to
officers who enter private dwellings through the use of deceit, threats, or
force,241 and who enter houses between 9 p.m. and 6 a.m. 242 In practice,
however, penal sanctions are never used against the police.
2 43
Searches of the domicile were nullified in France as early as 1910.2 4
The background leading to nullification can be summarized briefly. In
1808 the Code of Criminal Investigation 245 interpreted the constitutional
protection of the domicile as prohibiting police entry into a house, shop,
or building, unless judicial authorization was first obtained. The Code
237. Judgment of Nov. 25, 1882, Cass. crim., Fr., 1882 D.P. I 227.
238. Judgment of Nov. 7, 1889, RGSt, Ger., 20 Entscheidungen des RGSt 91 (1890).
239. A. WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS passim (1974). Even a cursory reading of the
Italian legal literature previously referred to reveals the extent to which Italian jurists have
acquainted themselves with comparative law. See Scaparone, supra note 136; Codero, supra
note 148; Cappelletti, supra note 156; M. CAPPELLETTI, supra note 157; Grevi, supra note 166.
240. CONSTITUTION of Dec. 13, 1799 (22 frimaire VIII) art. 76 (France), in 12 J.B.
DUVERGIER, COLLECTION COMPLtTE DES LOIS 20, 25 (Paris 2d ed. 1835).
241. C. PtN. art. 184. The JURIS-CLASSEUR PANAL at art. 184 p.3 6 (1984) lists no cases
brought against police officials under this article.
242. C. PR. PaN. art. 59.
243. See supra note 79.
244. Judgment of Feb. 18, 1910, Cass. crim., Fr., 1911 S. Jur. I 233.
245. CODE D'INSTRUCTION CRIMINELLE (1808), reprinted in 15 J. DUVERGIER, COLLEC-
TION COMPLPITE DES LOIS 319 (1836).
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permitted an exception for crimes in progress.246 French courts first
hinted, as early as 1857, that a nonconsensual, unauthorized police entry
into the home could lead to a nullity. 4 7 In 1882 the Court of Cassation
declared a "nullity based on public policy" when forestry police failed to
report an unwarranted search within the required twenty-four hours.2 4 8
Evidence from an unauthorized police search was nullified in a misde-
meanor case (ddlit) by the Court of Cassation in 1910.249 The same re-
sult was reached in criminal cases in 1926250 and 1935.251 Even during
World War II, the Court of Cassation excluded evidence because a war-
rant (commission rogatoire) issued to the judicial police failed to specify
reasons for the search. 52 In the 1953 case Isnard, the Court of Cassation
extended exclusion to all illegal searches performed by the judicial police
with insufficient warrants.2 53 In addition, the Isnard case reaffirmed254 a
strong "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine to exclude confessions re-
sulting from illegal searches. Isnard, however, also made a much criti-
cized concession 255 to the French police and permitted search warrants
for specific infractions to be issued without the name and address of the
party to be searched.256 This rule meant French police could carry blank
warrants and avoid the intervention of a neutral and detached magistrate
before a search took place.2 57 The intent of the Isnard rule was to avoid
delay and permit the police to carry out searches when a crime was in
progress. The result, however, was that almost no additional unlawful
246. CODE D' INSTRUCTION CRIMINELLE art. 16. (now replaced by C. PR. PfN. art. 59).
247. Judgment of April 30, 1857, Cour imp6riale, Fr., 1859 D.P. II 205. Although the
CODE D'INSTRUCTION CRIMINELLE provisions called for a nullity, the court treated failure to
protest as tacit consent. See unsigned casenote, id.
248. Judgment of Nov. 25, 1882, Cass. crim., Fr., 1883 D.P. I 227. Both of these early
cases, like Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) and Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961), involved petty offenses. Weeks involved use of the mails to transport lottery tickets,
Mapp possession of pornography, and the two French cases involved hunting violations.
249. Judgment of Feb. 18, 1910, Cass. crim., Fr., 1911 S. Jur. I 233.
250. Judgment of Aug. 28, 1926, Cass. crim., Fr., 1928 S. Jur. I 217.
251. Judgment of Dec. 27, 1935, Cass. crim., Fr., 1936 D.P. I 21.
252. Brief of State Counsel Brouchot, at 1, col. 2, Judgment of June 9, 1943, Cass. crim.,
Fr., 1943 J.C.P. II No. 2422, cited in 1953 J.C.P. II No. 7456 [hereinafter cited as State Coun-
sel's Brief].
253. Judgment of Jan. 22, 1953 (Isnard), Cass. crim., Fr., 1953 D.P. I 533 note C. Lapp,
1953 J.C.P. II No. 7456.
254. See Judgment of Dec. 27, 1935, Cass. crim., Fr., 1936 D.P. I 20 note P. Mimin.
255. Judgment of Jan. 22, 1953 (Isnard), Cass. crim., Fr., 1953 D. Jur. 534 note C. Lapp.
256. See State Counsel's Brief, supra note 252, at 2, col. 2.
257. Professor Caleb Foote (School of Law, University of California, Berkeley) informed
the author that it was also common practice for police in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania to carry a
book of signed, undated, blank warrants during the 1950's.
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search and seizure cases were reported until 1980.258
In 1977, the Conseil constitutionnel declared unconstitutional legis-
lation which would have permitted police to search any vehicle on a pub-
lic road.25 9 Commentators had read this decision as extending to
vehicles the same protection that had been granted previously to domi-
ciles.26 The warrant requirements for domiciles do not apply, however,
when police alleged probable cause for a search under the flagrant ddlit
provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure.2 6' This loophole appears
to have been closed by the Gomez-Garzon decision of May 30, 1980.262
In that case, Parisian police, acting on "confidential information," en-
tered Gomez's hotel room looking for drugs; instead they found stolen
watches. While in police custody, Gomez allegedly admitted using co-
caine. The Court of Cassation refused to admit evidence obtained from
the search and the subsequent confession because, prior to the search, the
police had no information that a crime was in progress. Thus, under
current French law, a warrantless search cannot be justified by mere pre-
search suspicion or post-search evidence. The nullification was justified
in the decision on the basis of a lack of conformity with the Code search
and seizure and the flagrant ddlit provisions. 263 As previously noted for
garde d vue violations, however, lack of conformity with established
Code procedures does not automatically lead to a nullity.2 4 The real
258. The author has found only one reported case between 1953 and 1980: Judgment of
June 19, 1957, Cass. crim., Fr., 1957 D. Jur. 564 (invitation to enter does not constitute con-
sent to a search).
259. Judgment of Jan. 12, 1977, Conseil constitutionnel [Con. const.], Fr., 1978 D.S. Jur.
173 note L. Hamon & J. Uaut6; 1978 L'ACTUALITt JURIDIQUE-DROIT ADMINISTRATIF
[A.J.D.A.] 215 note J. Rivero. The Court of Cassation nevertheless upheld a fine levied on a
citizen who refused to open his car trunk to an officer of the judicial police, Judgment of Nov.
8, 1979, Cass. crim., Fr., 1980 D.S.I.R. 523.
260. See note L. Hamon & J. Laut6, supra note 259, at 178.
261. Crimes are considered "flagrant" (i.e. obvious) in three senses: (1) when the perpetra-
tors are caught in the act or just afterwards (in American terms--"red-handed"); (2) shortly
after the act, bearing evidence ("hot pursuit"); and (3) if the deed becomes "obvious" after
police are invited into a private area by the occupant. Note W. Jeandidier on Judgment of
May 30, 1980 (Gomez-Garzon), Cass. crim., Fr., 1981 D.S. Jur. 533, 534. Prior to Gomez-
Garzon, French courts had accepted the fiction that a crime is "obvious" when the police
entered without an invitation, and a crime was underway in the sense of (1) or (2), even though
the crime was not obvious until they discovered it.
262. Judgment of May 30, 1980 (Gomez-Garzon), Cass. crim., Fr., 1981 D.S. Jur. 533 note
W. Jeandidier, 101 Gaz. Pal. 221 note M. Suzanne (counsel for the accused)(1981); abstract in
1980 J.C.P. IV No. 299. The case was also noted immediately in the popular press. See LE
MONDE, June 13, 1980, at 15.
263. C. PR. PN. arts. 56, 76 and 53.
264. The French law of nullities in criminal procedure is one of the less clearly defined
areas of the law. Judgment of Mar. 14, 1974, Cass. crim., Fr., 1974 D.S. Jur. 604, 605 note J.
Rovert. In addition to those nullities prescribed by the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Court
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justification for exclusion was the long line of French search and seizure
cases in which evidence was excluded.265 Gomez was not intended to
establish a new basis for exclusion but to close a loophole. Since Gomez
the Court of Cassation has reaffrmed exclusion for search and seizure
violations and lower courts have excluded evidence even for good faith
violations of the search and seizure provisions stipulated by the Code of
Criminal Procedure.266
2. Wiretaps
The French, like the Germans and the Italians, have shown an aver-
sion to electronic surveillance.26 7 Until the much-criticized Tournet de-
cision in 1980,26 it was uncertain that wiretaps were legal at all.
Although the Criminal Court of the Seine in Paris had consistently ad-
mitted wiretap evidence, even for minor crimes such as illegal bookmak-
ing,269 appellate courts rejected electronic surveillance as unreliable27° or
"indelicate."'2 7 Legal scholars also were unsure whether wiretaps were
legal, but noted the tendency in foreign law to require judicial authoriza-
tion for a wiretap.272
In Tournet, the Court of Cassation, for the first time, upheld an au-
thorized wiretap against a charged suspect.273 The court reasoned that
article 81 of the Code of Criminal Procedure permits the juge
of Cassation, on the authority of its President, has introduced additional nullities to protect
"the rights of the defense," "public policy and good administration of justice." In Gomez-
Garzon, supra note 262, the court did not justify nullification of the proceedings on these
grounds, but gave them as reasons for hearing the case.
265. Supra notes 11 & 247-53.
266. Judgment of Oct. 15, 1984, Cass. crim., Fr., unpublished; abstract at 1985 D.S.I.R
146; authorized copy on file at the Hastings International and Comparative Law Review.
Judgment of Feb. 18, 1982, Tribunal correctionnel de Vannes, 1983 D.S. Jur. 130 note P.
Chambon. Judgment of Jan. 24, 1985, Tribunal de grande instance, Paris, 1985 D.S. Jur. 498
(nullity of search and seizure and all subsequent acts; "consent to search" form used by police
in good faith found invalid despite suspect's signature because he could not read French).
267. Badinter, Le droit et l'ecoute dilectronique en droitfranqais, 8 PROC. INT'L SYMP. ON
COMP. L. 139 (Ottawa 1970).
268. The Court of Cassation authorizes wiretaps after a suspect has been formally accused
("inculpd") by ajuge d'instruction. Judgment of Oct. 9, 1980 (Tournet), Cass. crim., Fr., 1981
D.S. Jur. 332 note J. Pradel (urging restricting legislation on the German model); for addi-
tional criticism, see 1981 J.C.P. II No. 19578 note G. di Marino; 1981 J.C.P. I No. 3029 note
P. Chambon.
269. Judgment of Feb. 13, 1957, Tribunal correctionnel de la Seine, 1957 J.C.P. II No.
10069; Judgment of Oct. 30, 1964, Tribunal correctionnel de la Seine, 1965 D.S. Jur. 423.
270. Judgment of Nov. 7, 1956, Cour d'appel, Toulouse, 1957 D. Jur. 28.
271. Judgment of Mar. 28, 1960, Cour d'appel, Paris, 80 Gaz. Pal. Jur. 253 (1960).
272. G. STfFANI & G. LEVASSEUR, PROC]DURE PfNALE 29 n.8 (10th ed. 1977).
273. Judgment of Oct. 9, 1980 (Tournet), Cass. crim., Fr., 1981 D.S. Jur. 332.
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d'instruction to employ any useful methods to ascertain the truth, pre-
sumably including wiretaps.274 The Tournet decision implies, however,
that the evidence obtained from an unauthorized tap will be excluded.27
This implication is consistent with the French legislature's attitude to-
wards electronic surveillance.2 7 6  Unlike the German277 and Italian
278
legislatures, the French legislature has never provided for legal
wiretaps.
27 9
In conclusion, because electronic surveillance is disfavored in
France,280 French law has produced few exclusion cases concerning wire-
taps. If evidence from an unwarranted wiretap is offered in the future, in
all probability it will be excluded.
B. Germany
1. Legally Unobtainable Evidence
Historically, Germany has resisted exclusion of evidence obtained
through illegal searches and seizures.281 The reluctance to use exclusion
274. Id. (at close of the judgment).
275. Tournet held that a juge d'instruction could order a wiretap. Judgment of Oct. 9,
1980, Cass. crim. Fr., 1981 D.S. Jur. 332. In a more recent case, the Court of Cassation held a
wiretap could only be ordered by ajuge d'instruction on probable cause justifying opening an
investigation for a specific infraction, and that the tap must be under his control, without any
artifice or compromise of defendant's rights. Judgment of July 23, 1985 Cass. crim., Fr., un-
published, abstract at 1985 J.C.P. IV No. 338 (authorized copy on file at the Hastings Interna-
tional and Comparative Law Review). Nullities for irregularities by ajuge d'instruction have
long been a part of French law. See, e.g., Judgment of June 12, 1952, Cass. crim. Fr., 1952
J.C.P. II No. 7241. If ajuge d'instruction must authorize a wiretap, it follows afortiori that he
cannot make use of evidence gathered by the police through a wiretap which he did not
authorize.
276. For a recent survey, see Kayser, L'interception de communications tdliphoniques par
les autoritis publiquesfrangaises, in MfLANGES DfDIf.S A JEAN VINCENT 169 (1981).
277. STRAFGESETZBUCH [STGB] § 298, 1967 BGB1 I 1360 (W. Ger.) (superceded by
STGB § 201, 1975 BGB1 I 56) (requiring criminal penalties for recording without consent).
278. C.P.P. art. 226 bis (Law of April 8, 1974, n.97 art. 5, 1974 Gaz. Uff. 510) allows
wiretaps for crimes punishable by more than five years imprisonment, drug cases, arms and
explosive infractions, contraband, and threats made by telephone.
279. CODE CIVIL art. 9 (Law of July 17, 1970, art. 22, 1970 D.S.L. 204) and CODE PtNAL
art. 368 make no exception for police officials. One court has even allowed the criminal prose-
cution of a court official (huissier) for violating telecommunication laws by manually transcrib-
ing a phone call. Judgment of Jan. 5, 1978, Cour d'appel, Besangon, 1978 D.S. Jur. 357.
280. While French law was excluding tape recordings as unreliable (see supra note 270),
United States federal courts were developing criteria to determine authenticity. United States
v. McKeever, 169 F. Supp. 426, 430 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), rev'd on other grounds, 271 F.2d 669 (2d
Cir. 1959) ("McKeever factors").
281. See Judgment of Sept. 8, 1971, Kammergericht, Berlin, 25 NJW 169, 170 (1972);
Judgment of Mar. 3, 1978 Landgericht, Wiesbaden, 32 NJW 175 (1979) (criticized in note by




for illegal searches was due not only to police resistance to warrants, 282
but also to the basic philosophy of German criminal law and procedure.
German theory favors strict enforcement of laws and the rule of compul-
sory prosecution ("Legalitdtsprinzip")283 requires the public prosecutor
to pursue every significant crime.284 This rule was proposed originally in
the nineteenth century to free the newly instituted public prosecutor's
office from political pressure285 and was observed closely until the rise of
National Socialism.2 86  The "rule of compulsory prosecution" was itself
a reflection of the "theory of absolute punishment" embodied in Kant's
famous dictum requiring execution of the last murderer in prison as a
duty of a society before that society disbands.287
Although many German prosecutors still adhere to compulsory
prosecution even in minor matters,288 it has become less significant as
alternate remedies such as community work, payments to victims or
charities, and fines289 have been employed. In addition, state interests
such as testimonial immunity290 and, more importantly, constitutional
values, have weakened the rule of compulsory prosecution. Respect for
human dignity and the right of personality development guaranteed by
the Basic Law (the German Constitution),291 as well as the values of pri-
vate and family life protected by the European Human Rights Conven-
tion,292 have led the courts to balance mandatory prosecution against the
282. See supra note 115.
283. STPO § 152 (1877).
284. See Langbein, Controlling Prosecutorial Discretion in Germany, 41 U. CHI. L. REv.
439 (1974); see also Herrmann, The Rule of Compulsory Prosecution and the Scope of
Prosecutorial Discretion in Germany, 41 U. CHI. L. REv. 468, 477 (1974).
285. Kiiper, Legalitdtsprinzip, 2 HANDWbRTERBUCH ZUR DEUTSCHEN RECHTSGE-
SCHICHTE 1665 (1978).
286. Meyer-Gosner, in 2 LrwE-ROSENBERG, KOMMENTAR ZUR STP0152 Rdn.36 (1976).
R. GRUNBERGER, SOCIAL HISTORY, supra note 89, at 90.
287. I. KANT, DIE METAPHYSIK DER SrrrEN 199 (Kbnigsberg ed. 1797):
Even if that civil society dissolved itself with the consent of all its members (as for
example in the case of a people inhabiting an island resolving to separate and scatter
themselves throughout the world) the last murderer remaining in prison ought to be
executed before the resolution were carried out ...
288. Weigend, Prosecution: Comparative Aspects, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUS-
TICE 1296, 1300 (S. Kadish ed. 1983).
289. Id. at 1300-01.
290. C. ROXIN, STRAFVERFAHRENSRECHT 65 (17th ed. 1982).
291. GG art. 2, § 1 (W. Ger.): "Everyone has the right to the free development of his
personality in so far as this does not injure the rights of others and does not conflict with the
Constitutional order or moral law."
292. European Convention on Human Rights, opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950, art. 8,
para. 1, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, 230 (effective in the German Federal Republic Aug. 7, 1952, 1952
BGB1 II 685)[hereinafter cited as European Convention]. "Everyone has the right to respect
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right to privacy. To protect these rights, German courts have created a
category referred to here as "legally unobtainable evidence."
Legally unobtainable evidence stands on the borderline between
privileged and illegally obtained evidence.2 93 It is excluded not only be-
for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence." European Convention,
supra art. 8, para. 1.
293. German law, like United States law, protects communications between family mem-
bers as well as those between certain professionals and their clients. In the United States,
spouses have a privilege not to reveal communications between themselves. In California, for
example, witnesses can refuse to testify against a spouse. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 970 (West
1966).
By contrast, in Germany, witnesses have more than a privilege; they have a right not to
testify (STPO § 52 Zeugnisverweigerungsrecht) and must be informed of this right on pain of
exclusion. Judgment of Aug. 3, 1977, BGHSt, W. Ger., 27 Entscheidungen des BGHSt 231
(1978) (exclusion for failure to warn fianc6e of her right to refuse to testify). While German
privileges leave little discretion to the court, they do leave much discretion to the witness.
There is no German parallel to the California privilege which allows a defendant to pre-
vent a spouse from disclosing confidential communications made during the marriage. See
CAL. EVID. CODE. § 980 (West 1966). Family members are free to disclose any information
they wish. A scholar recently argued against a privilege or a right to silence for family mem-
bers, fearing this would hinder prosecution when a child molestation or other injury occurs
within the family. R. RENGIER, DIE ZEUGNISVERWEIGERUNGSRECHTE IM GELTENDEN UND
KUNFTIGEN STRAFVERFAHRENSRECHT 110, 254 (1979). Special legislation, however, could
easily deal with the situation where there has been a showing of a crime against a family
member. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 985 (West 1966).
Professional advisors have a corresponding "right to refuse to testify" similar to that
granted to family members. STPO §§ 53, 53a. The German Supreme Court has held, how-
ever, that clients may not suppress testimony if the professional advisor decides not to exercise
the right not to testify. Judgment of Jan. 12, 1956, BGHSt, W. Ger., 9 Entscheidungen des
BGHSt 59 (1957) (lawyers); Judgment of Oct. 28, 1960, BGHSt, W. Ger., 15 Entscheidungen
des BGHSt 200 (1960) (physicians). These judgments antedate important decisions excluding
evidence; nevertheless, for the time being, they are still good law. Indeed, since the 1975 revi-
sion of the Code of Criminal law (STGB § 203) the law no longer imposes a minimum fine or
prison term for professional advisors who betray their clients.
It is submitted that current German law on "rights not to testify," both for family mem-
bers and professional advisors, is inconsistent with the concept of the "intimate sphere" for
private communications protected by the decisions of the Federal Supreme Court and the
Federal Constitutional Court. The courts have held that protection of the "intimate sphere"
requires exclusion of clandestine tape recordings to protect privacy. By the same token, the
law should protect not only the rights of a potential witness to hear confidential statements; it
should protect the rights of an individual to make statements without fear that advisors or
family members will be free to disclose information later.
In no other environment is the protection of confidential statements more necessary than
within the family. Similarly, for professional advisors, the ability of the German doctor to
betray a patient is no longer consistent with current constitutional standards or with the new
bases which have been proposed for STGB § 205 and STPO § 53. Formerly, a physician's
"right not to testify" (STPO § 53) and the correlate protection of professional records (StPO
§ 97) were labelled "highly personal" rights. The rights did not survive the physician. Judg-
ment of Nov. 17, 1936, RGSt, Ger., 71 Entscheidungen des RGSt 21 (1938). More recently,
however, these rights have been given a constitutional basis, to protect the privacy and right to
personality development of the patient and remain even after the death of the physicians.
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cause of the method by which it is obtained, but also because of its con-
tent. The evidence itself need not be privileged; however, the evidence is
unobtainable because unacceptable methods are used to acquire it. For
example, a witness may testify to a conversation, but the same conversa-
tion cannot be recorded and offered as evidence. Evidence obtained
through unacceptable methods may be excluded even without state ac-
tion,294 in criminal as well as civil cases.
295
The Germans, like the French, have shown considerable hostility
towards "bugging," and many of the German exclusion cases have in-
volved unlawful tape recordings. In 1957, the BGH sustained an attor-
ney's right not to make a closing argument until a radio station had
removed its recording equipment.296 Recording without consent became
illegal in 1967,297 but even before this time, the courts began excluding
recordings in civil cases. After a Berlin appellate court permitted indi-
rect use of secret tapes in 1955,298 the BGH barred the use of recordings
Judgment of Mar. 8, 1972, Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG], W. Ger., 32 Entscheidungen
des Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] 373, 378 (1972). Judgment of Nov. 14, 1963,
Bundesgerichtshof in Zivilsachen [BGHZ], 40 W. Ger., Entscheidungen des BGHZ 288, 293
(1964).
Current law thus takes the contradictory position of authorizing the physician or the
physician's successor to withhold medical records for the purpose of protecting the patient's
constitutional rights, but still giving the physician the prerogative to violate these rights. If, as
the German courts hold, the purpose of STPO § 53 is to protect the patient by excluding this
evidence, then the decision to withhold medical records should be left to the patient and en-
forced by the courts, as is done in the United States and France. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE
993(a) (West 1966). Blondet, Le seret professionnel, in LA CHAMBRE CRIMINELLE ET SA
JURISPRUDENCE: RECUEIL D'ETUDES EN HOMMAGE A LA MfMOIRE DE MAURICE PATIN
199, 204 (1965); Gulphe, Le secret professionnel en droit franqais, in 25 TRAVAUX DE
L'ASSOCIATION HENRI CAPITANT: LE SECRET ET LE DROIT 105 (1974). Judgment of May
10, 1900, Cass. crim., Fr., 1901 S. Jur. I 161, 167 col. 3.
294. Judgment of May 20, 1958, BGHZ, W. Ger., 27 Entscheidungen des BGHZ 284, 285
(1958): "The rules of Articles 1 and 2 of the Basic Law. . . bind not only the state and its
organs, but are to be observed by everyone in private law matters." See also Judgment of Feb.
21, 1964, BGHSt, W. Ger., 19 Entscheidungen des BGHSt 325, 326 (1964) ("Diary case").
295. The German approach to exclusion in civil cases should be distinguished from the
British approach. In Britain, there is a trend to exclude evidence obtained through unaccept-
able means in civil, but not criminal, cases. The rationale for exclusion is equitable grounds: a
party cannot ask for justice unless it has clean hands. Tapper, Privilege and Confidence, 35
MOD. L. REv. 83, 87 (1972). Baade, Illegally Obtained Evidence in Criminal and Civil Cases:
A Comparative Study of a Classic Mismatch II, 52 TEX. L. REv. 621, 640-43 (1974). In Ger-
man law, as will be seen, "clean hands" is not a relevant issue. In the United States evidence is
only rarely excluded in civil cases, usually in divorce cases, e.g., Williams v. Williams, 8 Ohio
Misc. 156, 221 N.E.2d 622 (1966); Markham v. Markham, 272 So. 2d 813 (1973).
296. Judgment of Feb. 8, 1957, BGHSt, W. Ger., 10 Entscheidungen des BGHSt 202
(1957) (on grounds of protecting the accused).
297. STGB § 298, supra note 277.
298. Judgment of June 3, 1955, Kammergericht, Berlin, 9 NJW 26, 27 (1956).
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in civil cases. The BGH reasoned that the constitutional right to person-
ality development requires freedom of expression; this development
would be impossible if private conversations are allowed to be recorded
without consent.299
The extension of this doctrine to criminal cases occurred at the same
time that the United States Supreme Court accepted exclusion, sug-
gesting that, directly or indirectly, United States law influenced German
developments. Two cases illustrate this change.
In its decision of June 14, 1960,10 the BGH considered the admissi-
bility of privately recorded secret tapes in a criminal action against an
attorney who allegedly solicited a bribe to suppress his client's testimony.
The court considered the admissibility of the tapes both to impeach the
victim's testimony and to convict the attorney. With regard to impeach-
ment, the court relied on the principle of personality development, and
excluded the tapes, finding they had been prepared to undermine the
victim's credibility.30 The court did not decide whether a tape might be
used defensively to protect rights or redress a crime (defensive use was
prohibited in 1973).302 Nor did the court permit the use of the tapes
against the attorney, relying on principles of human dignity, the right
against self-incrimination, and the right to silence. The court recognized
that exclusion might deprive the state of the best or only means of solv-
ing a crime. Nevertheless, it concluded that the Code of Criminal Proce-
dure "does not require that the truth be won at any price. "303
Exclusion based on personality development was first extended to
personal papers in the famous Diary Case of 1964. 30 In that case, a
school teacher, called as a witness in the adultery trial of her former
lover, denied involvement with him and was later convicted of perjury on
the basis of her own diary. The BGH reversed, forbidding any use of the
diary. The court balanced the crime of perjury against the right to per-
299. Judgment of May 20, 1958, BGHZ, W. Ger., 27 Entscheidungen des BGHZ 284
(1958).
300. Judgment of June 14, 1960, BGHSt, W. Ger., 14 Entscheidungen des BGHSt 358
(1960). Cf Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960) (rejecting "silver platter" rule); Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
301. Judgment of June 14, 1960, BGHSt, W. Ger., 14 Entscheidungen des BGHSt 358, 362
(1960).
302. Judgment of Jan. 31, 1973, BVerfG, W. Ger., 34 BVerfGE 238 (1973), 28 JZ 504 note
G. Arzt (1973), 26 NJW 891 (1973).
303. Judgment of June 14, 1960, BGHSt, W. Ger., 14 Entscheidungen des BGHSt 358,
364-65 (1960).
304. Judgment of Feb. 21, 1964, BGHSt, W. Ger., 19 Entscheidungen des BGHSt 325
(1964) (abridged version), 17 NJW 1139 (1964) (complete version), partially translated in M.
CAPPELLETTI & W. COHEN, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 500 (1979).
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sonality development guaranteed by the German Basic Law and the
Human Rights Convention and held that "within certain boundaries"3 5
the interest in protecting privacy superseded that of fighting crime.3 °6
Noting that absolute exclusion for due process violations and other
grounds existed by statute,30 7 the court concluded that protection of per-
sonal papers could be made effective only through a similar exclusionary
rule.
30 8
The Diary Case extended exclusion in three important respects.
First, it protected personality development in a criminal case. Second, it
rejected a state action requirement for exclusion. Third, it established
the concept of a protected area within which evidence was unobtain-
able.309 This protected area is not a physical, but a psychological space,
reserved for intimate communications, including communcations with
oneself.310 No other legal system has an equivalent concept. For exam-
ple, in the United States, neither the fifth amendment nor the fourth
amendment presently protects private papers or diaries.31
The greatest extension of exclusion based on personality develop-
ment was made by Germany's highest court, the Federal Constitutional
Court, in its January 31, 1973, decision. 312 This decision dealt with sev-
eral conflicting interests. The complainant had been convicted of tax
evasion, forgery, and fraud in a real estate transaction. He asked the Fed-
eral Constitutional Court to exclude the major piece of evidence against
him, tapes of the transaction made secretly by the vendors to protect
themselves. The trial and appellate courts had admitted the tapes be-
cause the complainant's constitutional right to personality development
305. Judgment of Feb. 21, 1964, BGHSt, W. Ger., 19 Entscheidungen des BGHSt 325, 329
(1964) ("in bestimmtem Umfange"). The use of a personal diary as evidence appears only
slightly less extreme when it is remembered diaries were used as evidence under the Nazis, R.
GRUNBERGER, supra note 89, at 120, and are still admissible in United States law, I LAFAVE,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 2.6 n.123 (1978).
306. Judgment of Feb. 21, 1964, BGHSt, W. Ger., 19 Entscheidungen des BGHSt 325, 331
(1964).
307. Id. (citing StPO § 136a).
308. Id.
309. Id. Exclusion is limited to diaries with "highly personal contents." The BGH saw no
room for exclusion for non-personal diaries comprising mere records kept by businesspersons,
spies, or criminals.
310. See Anderson v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976). See also 1 LAFAvE, supra note 305,
at § 2.6(e) nn. 123 et seq. According to judges and scholars in the United States, fourth
amendment protection could be extended to evidence such as diaries and personal papers;
however, no court has yet done so. Id. at § 2.6 nn.130 et seq.
311. Judgment of Jan. 31, 1973, BVerfG, W. Ger., 34 BVerfGE 238 (1973), 26 NJW 891
(1973).
312. Id., 34 BVerfGE at 243.
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was outweighed by private and public interests.313
The Constitutional Court reversed and excluded the tapes, establish-
ing two levels of privacy. At the first level, the Court established an
absolutely protected area which could not be invaded for any reason:
"Even the predominating interests of the general public cannot justify an
intrusion in the absolutely protected nucleus [Kernbereich] of private life.
There can be no balancing [of public and private interests] according to
the standards of the proportionality principle." '314 "Highly personal mat-
ters" were thus absolutely protected by articles I and II of the Federal
Constitution.315 The Court made no effort to define "highly personal
matters," leaving this definition to later cases. 3 6 At the second level,
certain personal matters were given protection unless a compelling state
interest exists.31 7 The court found the tapes were protected at this sec-
ond level of privacy because preventing tax evasion was not a preponder-
ant governmental interest.318 As examples of preponderant state
interests which would override the second level of privacy, the Court
cited major crimes involving loss of life or limb or a threat to the demo-
cratic order.
While defendants in civil cases occasionally claim the protection of
the principles of human dignity and personality development, these cases
are rare. 3 9  As in France, Italy, and the United States, exclusion in Ger-
many is now principally sought in criminal actions.320
Recently the BGH has begun to apply exclusion time to evidence
acquired through police electronic surveillance. In its decision of March
313. Id. at 245.
314. Id. at 248. See also Judgment of Jan. 16, 1957, BVerfG, W. Ger., 6 BVerfGE 32, 41
(1957) (declaring that the Federal Constitution required "a last, untouchable area of human
freedom").
315. Judgment of Jan. 31, 1973, BVerfG, W. Ger., 34 BVerfGE 238, 248 (1973).
316. Id. at 246.
317. Id. at 248-49.
318. Id. at 249-50.
319. Not every case has been successful. See, e.g., Judgment of Oct. 3, 1979, OLG, Schles-
wig, 33 NJW 352 (1980) (a closely watched cashier's room in a casino is not a protected
workplace where a state employee can "develop his personality" by stealing banknotes).
The refusal of the Bavarian appellate court to extend "personality development" protec-
tion to a witness not charged with a crime appears inconsistent with the original purpose of the
Federal Supreme Court and Federal Constitutional Court. See Judgment of Nov. 8, 1978,
OLG, Bayern, 32 NJW 2624 (1979).
320. In the few, recent civil cases seeking exclusion of evidence on grounds of "personality
development," the evidence was admitted. Judgment of July 5, 1979, Kammergericht, Berlin,
1980 Entscheidungen der Oberlandesgerichte in Zivilsachen 200, 22 NJW 984 (1980) (photo of
nine-year-old damaging property admitted). Judgment of Nov. 24, 1981, BGHZ, W. Ger., 35
NJW 277 (1982) (clandestine recording of nuisance caller admitted.)
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16, 1983, the BGH held that evidence obtained accidentally when the
legally tapped phone of a married couple was left off the hook could not
be used.321 For the first time, the BGH invoked the "absolutely pro-
tected area" referred to by the Federal Constitutional Court in 1973322
and held that rights to human dignity and personality development re-
quired some "space" (Raum) where a married couple could share their
experiences, feelings, opinions, and emotions free of state interference.323
While the holding was limited to married couples, much of the language
refers to privacy in general and could be extended easily to unmarried
couples or others engaged in private conversation. In any event, the
court's willingness to exclude evidence of a major crime obtained in the
course of an authorized wiretap represents an important shift in German
policy.
Protection of privacy in Germany extends to areas not covered by
existing United States law. At the same time, the German practice of
limiting exclusion to "legally unobtainable evidence" has several disad-
vantages. First, the parameters of this protection are difficult for lawyers
and judges to define. Unlike the exclusionary rules of France, Italy, and
the United States, which guarantee freedomfrom specified intrusions, the
German rule guarantees freedom to develop one's personality. While it
may be relatively simple to recognize violations of persons, houses, pa-
pers, and personal effects,324 more imagination is required to discover the
potential for self-development in a given situation. Appellate courts,
therefore, have refused some claims for exclusion.32
An additional weakness of German law is that excluding "legally
unobtainable evidence" has little deterrent effect on the police or prose-
cutors. Before evidence can be excluded, an official has to obtain and
review it. Not only is the desired protection violated by the official re-
viewing the evidence, but police or prosecutors may feel compelled to
obtain evidence to decide if it is usable. Thus, they may be deterred from
using evidence but not from seeking it.
321. Judgment of Mar. 16, 1983, BGHSt, W. Ger., 31 Entscheidungen des BGHSt 296
(1983), 36 NJW 1569 (1983) ("Raumgesprichs" case). The BGH's Judgment of April 1986
reversing a conviction of "Red Army Faction" member Rolf Klemens Wagner because of an
illegal wiretap was not available. Liibecker Nachrichten, April 10, 1986.
322. Judgment of Jan. 31, 1973, BVerfG, W. Ger., 34 BVerfGE 238, 248 (1973).
323. Judgment of Mar. 16, 1983, BGHSt, W. Ger., 31 Entscheidungen des BGHSt 296,
300 (1983).
324. U.S. CONST. art. IV.
325. See supra notes 319-20.
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2. Illegally Obtained Evidence
Because of theories of absolute punishment and mandatory prosecu-
tion, German law has been more hostile to exclusion for search and
seizure violations than France, Italy, and the United States. Past deci-
sions of the German courts established limits on using evidence but not
on obtaining it. For example, a Wiesbaden court held that evidence that
could be obtained with a warrant could be obtained with a defective
one. 26 Taken to its logical conclusion, this rule would make warrants
unnecessary.
A growing minority of German criminal proceduralists believe that
exclusion of illegally obtained evidence should be imposed for search and
seizure violations.3 27 Many German opponents of exclusion did not dis-
pute its effectiveness in the United States, but argued exclusion should
not be extended in Germany because of basic differences between Ger-
man and United States law and society.328 A substantial number of Ger-
man specialists in criminal procedure, however, now believe that United
States principles, including the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine,
should be incorporated into German law.3 29 Apparently, penal measures
designed to protect suspects' rights330 and to protect against illegal
searches have proved inadequate. 31 Recently, the German Bar has
grown critical of the unlimited search authority of police officials.332
326. Judgment of March 3, 1978, Landgericht, Wiesbaden, 32 NJW 175 (1979), criticized
in 33 NJW 1053 note H.-H. Kiihne (1979). Indeed, in Switzerland, the Federal Supreme
Court has articulated such a rule: legally obtainable evidence is admissible even if illegally
obtained. See Judgment of May 9, 1973, Bundesgericht, Switz., 99 Entscheidungen des
Schweizerischen Bundesgerichtes 12, 15 (1973); Judgment of Nov. 9, 1978, Obergericht, Zu-
rich and Bundesgericht, 77 SCHWEIZERISCHE JURISTEN-ZEITUNG 130, 131 § 1, 132 § 4(b)
(1981). The result of the Swiss rule is that in the absence of effective administrative controls,
the police would be foolish to risk seeking a warrant. At best, the magistrate could only tell
them to do what they wanted to do anyway. At worst, they would risk making themselves
liable to a charge of abuse of authority. This is precisely what happened to Italian police
officers who insisted on examining a typewriter after they had been denied a warrant. Judg-
ment of Dec. 10, 1960, Trib., Benevento, 113 Giur. Ital. II 144, 149 (1961).
327. Griinwald, Beweisverbote und Verwertungsverbote im Strafverfahren, 21 JZ 489, 499
(1966). Judgment of July 13, 1984, Landgericht, Bremen, 17 JURISTiSCHE ARBErrSBLKTER
119 note U. Brauns (1985), 33 NJW 175 note H.-H. Kiihne (1979).
328. 2 LbwE-ROSENBERG, KOMMENTAR ZUR STPO § 136a Rdn. 52 (18th ed. 1978).
329. 2 L6WE-ROSENBERG, KOMMENTAR ZUR STPO § 136a Rdn. 66 at n.153 (24th ed.
1984).
330. STGB § 343 (1877), amended Jan. 7, 1975, 1975 BGB1 I 76.
331. Formerly STGB § 342 incorporated § 123 (unwarranted intrusion into a dwelling) for
police searches. STGB § 342 is entirely omitted from the current version of the code. Amend-
ment of Jan. 7, 1975, 1975 BGB1 I 76.
332. Achenbach, Verfahrenssichernde und vollstreckungssichernde Beschlagnahme im
Strafprozess, 29 NJW 1068 (1976). Kohlmann, Beschlagnahme, 1982 DIE WIRTSCHAFr-
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Some district courts, recognizing that abuses occur, have begun to ex-
clude evidence from illegal searches.
One of the first exclusion cases occurred in Bonn."' In late April
1980 nine officers of the German tax bureau entered a lawyer's office
seeking information concerning the lawyer's bank account.334 With a
warrant to conduct only a limited search, and without probable cause to
widen its scope, the officers seized documents including private corre-
spondence and extended their investigations into the lawyer's home and
bedroom. The lower court denied the lawyer's request for the return of
his papers. The Bonn district court (Landgericht) reversed, holding the
papers could not be considered as evidence and were to be returned, be-
cause the seizure had violated article 13 of the Constitution, which pro-
tects the inviolability of the home. 335 This decision represents a
significant shift in the German law of criminal procedure. Previously,
article 13 was never mentioned in German exclusion cases; the older
cases relied on the constitutional right to personality development guar-
anteed by article 2. The Bremen district court has followed the Bonn
court's lead and invoked article 13 to reverse a conviction based upon
evidence obtained through a search that exceeded the confines of the
magistrate's warrant.336
The most original aspect of the Bonn decision was the court's em-
phasis on how the evidence had been obtained, rather than on the con-
tent of the evidence. The Bonn court took the view that to exclude
evidence a court should weigh not only the seriousness of the accused's
crime and the intrusion on privacy interests, but also the seriousness of
the police misconduct. 337 Finding that the officers' search was in flagrant
excess of the warrant, the Bonn court relied on the minority deterrence
rationale for excluding evidence. According to the court, gross or inten-
tional violations of an officer's duty of due care will lead to exclusion, and
SPROFUNG 70, 74. Krekeler, Beeintrdchtigungen der Rechte des Mandanten durch
Strafverfolgungsmassnahmen gegen den Rechtsanwalt, 30 NJW 1417 (1977). Streck,
Erfahrungen beiderAnfechtung von Durchsuchungs- undBeschlagnahmebeschltissen in Steuer-
strafsachen, 1984 STRAFVERTEIDIGER 348, 350.
333. Judgment of July 1, 1980, Landgericht, Bonn, 1 ZErrSCHRIFr FfR WIRTSCHAFC-
SRECHT UND INSOLVENZPRAXIS [ZIP] 805, 807-08 (1980), 34 NJW 292 (1981). The issue was
framed as to whether the evidence could be considered rather than whether it was to be ex-
cluded, because the petitioner had requested return of the documents before charges were
brought. On searches of lawyers' offices, see Krekeler, supra note 332.
334. Judgment of July 1, 1980, Landgericht, Bonn, 1 ZIP 805 (1980).
335. Id. at 807.
336. Judgment of July 13, 1984, Landgericht, Bremen, 17 JURISTISCHE ARBEITSBLTrER
119 (1985).
337. Judgment of July 1, 1980, Landgericht, Bonn, I ZIP 805, 807 (1980).
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the greater the illegality, the more necessary exclusion becomes."3 '
The Federal Constitutional Court also appears to be leaning towards
exclusion of illegally obtained evidence. In the Judgment of May 5,
1977, the court considered the admissibility of medical records seized at
a drug rehabilitation center,339 and excluded the records because of the
invasion of the sphere of privacy protected by articles I and II of the
Basic Law. Before reaching this issue, however, the court considered the
legality of the nighttime search as an alternative ground for exclusion.
The court found that the drug rehabilitation center qualified as a
"home," protected by the search and seizure statute;3" here the search
satisfied the requirements of the statute. However, the court's analysis of
this issue suggests that the search would have been invalid and the evi-
dence excluded on statutory grounds if these requirements had not been
met.
In summary, German law has now developed a system of exclusion
to deal with various types of unlawful evidence. Recent decisions indi-
cate that the BGH now recognizes that illegal searches by the police oc-
cur,3 4 1 and the current trend is to expand the use of exclusion to deter
misconduct by police or other state officials.3 42 Before long, the BGH
will be faced with the same dilemma as lower courts and courts in
France, Italy, and the United States: whether to admit and justify the
use of illegally obtained evidence or to exclude it. From the perspective




Under the influence of United States law, Italian scholars have ad-
338. For a United States parallel, cf United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 141 (1984)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (reasonableness of a search depends on balancing the need to search
against the extent of the invasion).
339. Judgment of May 5, 1977, BVerfG, W. Ger., 44 BVerfGE 353 (1977).
340. Id. at 369.
341. Judgment of June 6, 1978, BGHSt, W. Ger., 31 NJW 1815 (1978) (no post factum
determination of the legality of a search unless there is a risk of repetition). Judgment of April
18, 1980, BGHSt, W. Ger., 29 BGHSt 244 (1980), 33 NJW 1700 (1980) (exclusion of evidence
and "fruit of the poisonous tree" obtained through violation of postal secrecy laws).
342. Judgment of Mar. 17, 1983, BGHSt, W. Ger., 31 BGHSt 304 (1983), 3 NSTZ 446
(1983), 39 JZ 386 (1984), 36 NJW 1570 (1983), 37 MDR 386 (1983) (evidence excluded when
unlawful wiretap is used in combination with deception. The court left open the issues




vocated exclusion of illegally obtained evidence for several decades.34
As in Germany, the first search and seizure cases involved electronic sur-
veillance rather than physical searches. 3" In 1970, the Italian Constitu-
tional Court stated that judicial evaluation of the evidence "presupposes
that that evidence not be forbidden by law." 4 ' This dictum from the
Court was welcomed by scholars as the first step towards an exclusionary
rule.346 Wiretap exclusion, and exclusion in general, received its greatest
impetus, however, in the Marazzani decision of April 6, 1973, when the
Constitutional Court announced that as a matter of constitutional law
evidence from unwarranted taps would be inadmissible.347 The Court
emphasized "the principle that action calculated to violate the fund-
mental rights of a citizen cannot be used as a justification and basis for a
prosecution against he who has suffered these unconstitutional ac-
tions." '48 Commentators greeted this decision as a major step in the de-
velopment of constitutional and procedural law.349
Although in Marazzani the court rejected a challenge to the admissi-
bility of an authorized wiretap, it indicated in the future it would exclude
evidence from illegal wiretaps. Following this decision, the legislature in
1974 passed a statute, which had retroactive effect,350 excluding unlaw-
fully intercepted communications.35 '
Despite some resistance from some lower courts as late as 1978,52
343. Cappelletti, Efficacia di prove illegittimamente ammesse e comportamento della parte,
7 RIVISTA DI DIRrrrO CIVILE 556 (1961). Vigoriti, Prove illecite e costituzione, 23 (n.s.) RIv.
DIR. PROC. 64 (1968).
344. Judgment of April 28, 1969, Trib., Rome, 74 GIuSTIZiA PENALE III 631 (1969),
translated in M.CAPPELLETrI & W. COHEN, supra note 28, at 540.
345. Judgment of Dec. 2, 1970, No. 175, Corte cost., Italy, 15 Giur. Cost. 2101 (1970), 93
Foro It. I 2985, extract in M. CAPPELLETrI & W. COHEN, supra note 28, at 496.
346. Grevi, Insegnamenti, moniti e silenzi della Corte Costituzionale in tema di intercetta-
zioni telefoniche, 18 Giur. Cost. 317, 338-39 n.66 (1973). N. TROCKER, PROCESSO CIVILE E
COSTrruZIONE 603 n.76 (1974).
347. Judgment of April 6, 1973, No. 34, Corte cost., Italy, 18 Guir. Cost. 316 (1973), 96
Foro It. 1 953 (1973), translated in M. CAPPELLETTI & W. COHEN, supra note 28, at 497. The
decision followed the German Federal Constitutional Court Judgment of Jan. 31, 1973, 34
BVerfGE 238, supra note 302. This reflects the legal climate at the time, but the possibility of
a direct influence is strengthened by the fact that the case originated in the German speaking
section of Italy (Bolzano).
348. Judgment of April 6, 1973, Corte cost., Italy, 18 Giur. Cost. 316, 338 (1973).
349. Grevi, supra note 346, at 338.
350. C.P.P. art. 226 quinquies, Law of April 8, 1974 n.98, 1974 Gaz. Uff. 510.
351. Law of April 8, 1974, n.98, 1974 Gaz. Uff. 510.
352. Judgment of Sept. 25, 1978, Trib., Milan, 22 Riv. ITAL. DIR. PRO. PEN. 1597 (1979),
rev'd, Judgment of May 19, 1980, Corte app., Milan, 133 Giur. Ital. II 386 (1981). Other
courts accepted the new legislation immediately. See Judgment of Nov. 12, 1974, Corte cass.,
Italy, 100 Foro It. 11173 note M. Boschi (1977) (decision of the instructing magistrate (giudice
istruttore) to nullify unwarranted wiretap not appealable).
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exclusion of evidence from some unwarranted taps is now accepted. The
Court of Cassation has applied the rule broadly and some courts have
used the exclusionary statute to prohibit other types of electronic surveil-
lance. 3  Courts have also excluded the "poisonous fruit" of illegal wire-
taps, 354 and evidence obtained from legal wiretaps for crimes other than
the one for which the tap was authorized. 5
2. Illegal Search and Seizure
Italian, like French and German law, has several statutes designed
to prevent illegal searches and seizures. Article 13 of the Italian Consti-
tution forbids detaining or searching persons without judicial authoriza-
tion." 6 Article 14 prohibits house searches except in the manner and
under the circumstances provided by law 7.35  The Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure requires twenty-four hours' advance judicial authorization for
house searches.3 58 In cases of crimes in progress or escapes, the police
may undertake searches without judicial authorization, but the Code re-
quires post-search justification.35 9 The Penal Code also provides crimi-
nal penalties for public officials who enter a dwelling without
authorization. In practice, however, these criminal provisions are never
invoked. 6° Italian scholars, therefore, have long advocated the use of
nullities for unwarranted searches.361 In September 1973, shortly after
Marazzani, Italian examining magistrates began excluding evidence from
illegal searches. The principle of exclusion of evidence from illegal
searches now has been affirmed repeatedly by the Court of Cassation. 362
353. Judgment of Jan. 9, 1975, Corte d'Assise, Pisa, 19 Riv. IT. DIR. PRO. PEN. 1102 note
F. Cervetti (1976) (electronic surveillance of detainees).
354. Judgment of July 14, 1983, Corte cass., Italy, 110 Riv. PEN. 87 (1984).
355. Judgment of Dec. 6, 1978, Corte cass., Italy, 1980 Massimario Annotato Cassazione
Penale 819 note C. Piacentini.
356. COSTITUZIONE art. 13.3 (Italy).
357. Id. art. 14.2.
358. C.P.P. art. 332.1
359. C.P.P. arts. 224.1 and 224.2. See P. GUALTIERI, PERQUISIZIONI ED ISPEZIONI DE
POLIZIA 26 (1979).
360. C.P. art. 615 (Penalties of up to one year imprisonment for entry without formalities,
up to five years for abuse of authority in entering). In the only criminal case found by this
author, intent could be clearly proven because the police officers had been denied a warrant by
a magistrate. Judgment of Dec. 10, 1960, Trib., Benevento, 113 Giur. Ital. 11 144 (1961).
361. See P. GUALTIERI, supra note 359, at 48 n.62 and authorities cited therein.
362. Compare Judgment of Oct. 10, 1972, Corte cass., Italy, 1976 ARCHIVO PENALE II 51,
cited in 90 Foro It. Repertorio 2307 (1976) with Judgment of Sept. 12, 1973, Trib., Milan, 100
Riv. PEN. 894 (1974). For the current view, see Judgment of Sept. 26, 1980, Corte cass., Italy,
133 Giur. Ital. 11 113 (1981) (also discussed infra note 366); Judgment of Feb. 13, 1981, Corte
cass., Italy, 1982 Foro It. Repertorio 2194 (abstract) (nullity from a house search does not
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Developments in the Italian exclusionary rule must be appreciated
in the context of two factors. First, there is the traditional doctrine of
"free evaluation of the evidence," under which judges should not be en-
cumbered in evaluating evidence by a priori rules.363 Second, there is the
passage, in 1978, of special anti-terrorist legislation permitting extensive
searches. 3 Many feared this special legislation would encourage police
arbitrariness and judicial laxity.36 The Court of Cassation has contin-
ued to hold, however, that:
Once the nullity of a search has been ascertained on the basis of
C.P.p. Art. 185, the consequences cannot be avoided. That is, if the act
of the search was void, the efficacy of the seizure is no longer discuss-
able, and thus the evidence gained from the seizure cannot be used.366
Despite the emergency measures of 1978 and a tradition of free eval-
uation of the evidence, the exclusionary rule has been adopted by Italian
scholars and courts. The conclusion of the United States scholar,
Kaplan, that "the exclusionary rule is hardly a facet of American juris-
prudence which has aroused admiration the world over,, 3 67 is today in
need of correction. Since Kaplan wrote in 1974, scholars in Italy have
followed the United States rule with interest and admiration.368
Although the United States exclusionary rule was not the first, it has
extend to other parts of the procedure, but involves only the evidentiary elements derived from
it).
363. Free evaluation of evidence was first instituted in France after the Revolution to re-
place the medieval system of legal proofs that required judges to mechanically weigh evidence
or count witnesses (e.g., one baron as equivalent to six commoners). Cappelletti, Social and
Political Aspects of Civil Procedure, 69 MICH. L. REv. 847, 849 (1971). Free evaluation left
judges to believe or disbelieve evidence according to their "inner conviction." Under French
influence, it penetrated German law (STPO § 261) and Italian law. H. NAGEL, DIE
GRUNDZOGE DES BEWEISRECHTS IM EUROPAISCHEN ZIVILPROZESS 257 (1967); M. NOBILI,
IL PRINCIPIO DEL LIBERO CONVINCIMENTO DEL GIUDICE (1974). Free evaluation has been
criticized in Italy where it has been used to admit illegally obtained evidence. G. LEONE,
MANUALE DI DxRrrro PROCESSO PENALE 429 (9th ed. 1975), or "poison fruit," Pisapia, La
protection des droits de l'homme dans la procidure pinale, 49 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE
DROrr PANAL 181, 213 (1978).
364. Law of Dec. 15, 1979, art. 6, No. 625, 1979 Gaz. Uff. 1231, 1232 (Measures for the
Preservation of the Democratic Order and Public Security). The provisions permit considera-
ble expansions in emergency search and seizure powers. In cases of suspected terrorism, art. 9
extends this authority to entire blocks.
365. Salvini, 11 D.L. 14 dicembre 1979 N. 625, 24 Riv. IT. DIR. PRO. PEN. 1455, 1469
(1981).
366. Judgment of Sept. 26, 1980, Corte cass., Italy, 133 Guir. Ital. II 113 (1981) (evidence
nevertheless admitted because issue first raised on appeal).
367. Kaplan, The Limits of the Exclusionary Rule, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1027, 1032 (1974).
368. E.g., G. ILLUMINATI, LA DISCIPLINA PROCESSUALE DELLE INTERCETTAZIONI 9
(1983).
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been emulated even in those countries with longstanding statutory sanc-
tions for police lawlessness. The French, German, and Italian exper-
iences suggest that penal measures to protect civil liberties are inadequate
substitutes for exclusion.
V. "FRUIT OF THE POISONOUS TREE" DOCTRINE
A. France
Without a "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine, 369 exclusion of evi-
dence, whether illegally obtained or "legally unobtainable," has little de-
terrent effect. France, which has the oldest system of exclusion in
Europe, has long applied a "fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine." The
doctrine was explained by one French scholar in 1936: "when one act of
procedure is null, the others are not touched, except those which have
their origin in the nullified act."3 7 Currently, judgments will be nullified
in France if the court testimony371 or evidence in the dossier 372 has been
tainted by illegality.
In contrast, Germany and Italy, which have less experience with
illegally obtained evidence, were uncertain of the effect exclusion should
have on derivative evidence. In their uncertainty, the two countries went
to opposite extremes.
B. Germany
At first, German scholars believed that evidence that was illegally
obtained or "legally unobtainable" should not have a "distant effect"
(Fernwirkung), that is, a tainting effect, on derived evidence.373 Many
369. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920). The phrase "fruit of
the poisonous tree" was first used with respect to illegally obtained evidence in Nardone v.
United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1930).
370. Judgment of Dec. 27, 1935, Cass. crim., Fr., 1936 D.P. I 20 note P. Mimin (annota-
tion provides extensive citations).
371. Judgment of Feb. 18, 1910, Cass. crim., Fr., 1911 S. Jur. 1233,235; Judgment of June
4, 1969, Cass. crim., Fr., 1970 J.C.P. II No. 16187.
372. Judgment of Jan. 22, 1953, Cass. crim., Fr., 1953 D. Jur. 533; Judgment of June 4,
1969, Cass. crim., Fr., 1970 J.C.P. II No. 16187; Judgment of Feb. 15, 1975, Chambre
d'Accusation, Paris, 1975 J.C.P. II No. 18020 (2' espece); Judgment of Feb. 18, 1982, Tribunal
correctionnel de Vannes, 1983 D.S Jur. 130. Compare Judgment of Jan. 7, 1943, Cour d'appel,
Grenoble, 1943 S. Jur. 15 (confession considered independent evidence) with Judgment of May
30, 1980, Cass. crim., Fr., 1981 D.S. Jur. 533 ("alleged confession" subsequent to an unlawful
search not admitted).
373. For examples of the older view, see 2 L6wE-ROSENBERG, KOMMENTAR ZUR STRAF-
PROZESSORDNUNG § 136a, Rdn. 66 (24th ed. 1984). The trend in favor of Fernwirkung is no
doubt related to recognition of police abuses of civil rights, see, e.g., Judgment of Sept. 8, 1971,
Kammergericht, Berlin, 25 NJW 1971 (1972) (alleged radical searched five times in one year,
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German scholars now fear, however, that exclusion will be undermined
without a "distant effect."
374
Until recently this debate was a hypothetical one because evidence
had been excluded in only a few criminal cases.3 75 Nevertheless, in a
February 22, 1978, decision, the Second Senat of the Bundesgerichtshof
in Strafsachen [BGHSt] excluded tainted evidence.3 76 In that case, inves-
tigators obtained a confession after playing a taped telephone conversa-
tion. The investigators did not use force or deception but the recording
itself, made in violation of the Federal wiretap statute,377 was illegal.
The Second Senat of the BGHSt excluded all statements obtained as a
result of playing the tape, although it permitted investigators to follow
leads suggested by the tape.37 8 In its decision of April 18, 1980, however,
the Second Senat of the BGHSt limited the extent to which investigators
could pursue leads obtained from illegal evidence 79 and officially recog-
nized exclusion based on Fernwirkung for some illegally obtained
evidence.
There are still critics of Fernwirkung, even within the BGH. 8 °
Nevertheless, the majority of German scholars are convinced of the need
for some limits on tainted evidence.38'
contrary to lawful procedures: use of pass-key before requesting normal entry, warrant not
signed, search-victim not permitted to be present during operation).
374. Judgment of April 30, 1968, BGHSt, W. Ger., 23 JZ 750, 753 note G. Griinwald
(1968). C. ROXIN, STRAFVERFAHRENSRECHT § 24(IV) (19th ed. 1985).
375. Judgment of Feb. 12, 1976, OLG, Hamburg, 30 MDR 601 (1976). It appears to have
gone unnoticed that the BGHSt required "distant effect" when it excluded any further use of
the accused's diary in the "Diary Case," Judgment of Feb. 21, 1964, BGHSt, W. Ger., 19
BGHSt 325, 334 (1964).
376. Judgment of Feb. 22, 1978, BGHSt 2. Sen., W. Ger., 27 BGHSt 355 (1978). The
BGHSt, like the BGHZ and the Federal Constitutional Court are comprised of multiple
benches (Senate), which agree in principle, but nevertheless may show divergent tendencies.
377. STPO § 100a, enacted Aug. 13, 1968, 1968 BGBI 1 949, 951, amended May 31, 1978,
1978 BGBI 1 643). See Carr, Wiretapping in Germany, 29 AM. J. COMP. L. 607 (1981); Brad-
ley, The Exclusionary Rule in Germany, 96 HARV. L. REv. 1032, 1054 (1983).
378. Judgment of Feb. 22, 1978, BGHSt 2. Sen., W. Ger., 27 BGHSt 355, 358 (1978).
379. Judgment of April 18, 1980, BGHSt 2. Sen., W. Ger., 29 BGHSt 244 (1980), 33 NJW
1700 (1980)(the excluded evidence was obtained indirectly through a violation of the constitu-
tionally protected secrecy of the mail). The extent to which indirectly obtained evidence will
be suppressed in future cases will depend on each situation and the type of exclusionary rule
violated.
380. Judgment of Aug. 24, 1983, BGHSt 3. Sen., W. Ger., 3 NSTZ 275 (1984) (illegal tap
did not influence subsequent confession; procedural errors have no Fernwirkung on remainder
of the process; the evidence probably would have been discovered even without the wiretap).
381. Cf critical note of J. Wolter in 4 NSTZ 276 (1984).
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C. Italy
Article 189 of the Italian Code of Criminal Procedure states that a
nullity at one stage of the criminal procedure invalidates later stages.38 2
Originally, this provision was intended to apply to "essential" proce-
dures, such as interrogation of the accused 3 3 and the subpoena to appear
in court.384 Some courts, however, in applying article 189 to illegally
obtained evidence, have nullified not only the evidence but every aspect
of the procedure.385 In reaction to such drastic extensions of article 189,
Italian courts required a "logical connection" '386 between the illegally ob-
tained evidence and the subsequent procedure. Regardless of the merit of
this approach, which has now been abandoned,387 the result was that
illegally obtained evidence was admitted.388
An alternate approach, favored by scholars following the United
States example, 389 excluded evidence without nullifying the entire proce-
dure. 390 The Court of Cassation now holds that article 189 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure "presupposes" a distinction between "propulsive
acts" (procedures which move the process forward, such as a summons
to appear) and "acts for the acquisition of evidence." Complete nullifica-
tion of later stages is justified for irregular "propulsive acts," whereas
irregularities in the acquisition of evidence render only that evidence
"unusable. , 391
In summary, German and Italian law began at opposite ends of the
spectrum but reached a conclusion similar to that reached in France and
the United States: exclusion requires not only that improperly acquired
evidence "shall not be used before the court, but also that it shall not be
used at all."'392 Considering the historical, procedural, and social differ-
382. C.P.P. art. 189 (1930) ("The nullity of a procedure, when it is so declared, renders null
succeeding acts derived from it.").
383. C.P.P. arts. 184-189 (1930).
384. C.P.P. art. 179 (1930).
385. Judgment of July 7, 1970, Corte app., Florence, 123 Giur. Ital. II 359 (1971); Judg-
ment of April 2, 1971, Trib., Bologna, 123 Giur. Ital. II 364 (1971).
386. Judgment of Oct. 7, 1975, Corte cass. (unpublished), cited in Casalinuovo, Nullitd e
loro difussione agli atti derivati, 132 Giur. Ital. 11 173, 175 n.6 (1980).
387. The court explained further that the relationship between the nullity and other acts
must be "causal" and not "accidental." Id.. It is perhaps not possible to do justice to this
analysis on the basis of the extract printed in Casalinuovo, supra note 386.
388. Judgment of July 13, 1979, Corte d'Assise Appello, Turin, 132 Giur. Ital. 11 174 n.6
(1980).
389. Amodio, Diritto al silenzio o dovere di collaborazione 29 RiV. DIR. PRO. 408, 419
(1974).
390. Judgment of Feb. 9, 1979, Corte cass., Italy, 132 Giur. Ital. II 324 (1980).
391. Id. at 325.
392. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
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ences between the countries discussed here, it is remarkable that this con-
vergence has occurred.
VI. PROCEDURAL BARRIERS TO EXCLUSION:
FRANCE AS AN EXAMPLE
In France, evidence is excluded through a complicated process.
Nullities required by the Court of Cassation, such as for search and
seizure violations, may be raised at trial.393 Other nullities, due to omis-
sion of a warning through delayed charging or improper interrogation of
a witness, must be raised before the juge d'instruction. The juge
d'instruction is incapable of declaring the existence of a nullity; if thejuge
d'instruction feels exclusion is required he or she may refer the matter to
an appellate bench, the chambre d'accusation, for determination.394
Many French lawyers have not yet developed the expertise to handle this
process, which even specialists describe as "obscure. '395  In addition,
practical barriers to requesting a nullity remain. The complexity of the
nullificiation process, combined with the difficulties in obtaining bail
3 9 6
may discourage some defendants from seeking exclusion for fear of pro-
longing incarceration.
Despite these barriers, evidentiary nullities have increasingly been
sought and granted in the past decade.397 Legislation passed in 1975 at-
tempting to limit nullities to cases in which "the interests of the party
concerned are affected" 398 has apparently had little effect.
393. Judgment of Feb. 18, 1982, Tribunal correctionnel de Vannes, 1983 D.S. Jur. 131, 132
note P. Chambon (1982). Judgment of Jan. 24, 1985, Tribunal de grande instance, Paris, 1985
D.S. Jur. 498 note Pradel.
394. The Court of Cassation has reaffirmed that only thejuge d'instruction or the prosecu-
tor can appeal to the chambre d'accusation (not the accused). Judgment of Oct. 24, 1978,
Cass. crim., Fr., 1978 Bull. crim. 742, cited in 99 Gaz. Pal. Table analytique 117, § 38 (1979).
395. Note P. Strasser on Judgment of Jan. 27, 1978, Cour d'appel de Lyon, 1979 D.S. Jur.
390, 391.
396. Judgment of Feb. 19, 1980, Fr., 1980 D.S. Jur. 356 note P. Chambon. In 1984 there
were 18,849 condemned prisoners in France, compared to 15,527 awaiting trial. Perier-
Daville, La detention provisoire, 104 Gaz. Pal. Doct. 390. Cf Pradel, La loi du 9juillet 1984
sur le recul de la detention provisoire: un pas en avant utile?, 1985 D. Chronique 7.
397. Judgment of Oct. 15, 1984 (Chajmowicz) (unpublished), abstract in 1985 D.S.I.R. 146
(authorized copy on file at the Hastings International and Comparative Law Review). The
fact that the case has not been published is an indication of how common exclusion is becom-
ing in France.
398. C. PR. PfiN. art. 802 (Law of Aug. 6, 1975). Scholarly reaction to art. 802 has been
critical due to the absence of objective standards defining the "interests of the party." The
French bar feels this gives judges too much discretion. Judgment of Feb. 27, 1978, Cass. crim.,
Fr., 1979 J.C.P. II No. 19113. Maurice-Hersant, Suite d "Reflexions sur l'article 802 du code
de procedure pdnale, 1979 D.S. I 259.
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VII. CONCLUSION
United States lawyers can learn the following lessons from criminal
law and procedure in France, Germany, and Italy. First, there is nothing
unique to the United States about exclusion of illegally obtained evi-
dence. Exclusion was discussed by European scholars and courts de-
cades before it became a part of United States law, and has been
employed in many countries to ensure judicial integrity, raise standards
of police behavior, and protect civil liberties.
Second, with regard to due process violations, exclusion was incor-
porated into German law because no alternative methods were available
to control police abuses; however, it was rejected by French courts which
preferred not to limit the police interrogation. Italian law adopted the
most radical solution and banned police interrogation of suspects
entirely.
Third, with regard to Miranda warnings, the civil law provides a
reminder that the purpose of a right to silence warning is to ensure not
only that a suspect's statements are voluntary, but also that they are
made with an understanding of legal rights. On the other hand, the
"good faith exception" adopted in France for omission of the right to
silence warning is fraught with danger. Based on this exception, state-
ments to French police are admissible unless the police intentionally
withhold the warning. This exception was a political concession to police
investigators and is condemned by French legal scholars. Since the
warning is required in France at a much later stage of the criminal proce-
dure, the good faith exception is of little relevance to the United States
experience. In Germany, the BGH's decision of June 7, 1983, gives trial
judges discretion to inquire into police compliance with the statutory re-
quirement and thereby deters future violations.
Fourth, the increased use of exclusion by courts to deal with search
and seizure violations, even in legal sytems with longstanding statutes
designed to curb police misconduct, indicates that it is an essential tool
for reform in criminal procedure. The degree to which exclusion does
deter police abuses is difficult to determine on the basis of appellate cases.
Some German courts and scholars have explicitly stated that the goal of
exclusion is deterrence.
In summary, comparative law suggests that exclusion is a remedy
arising not only from the United States Constitution, but also from the
constitution of any legal system that respects civil liberties and human
rights. Whether current trends in the United States will affect continen-
tal law is difficult to predict, but reforms will probably continue in
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France where exclusion and civil liberties are deeply rooted. Exclusion
in Germany is also solidly founded in the Basic Law; however, the ab-
sence of foreign models may slow developments there and in Italy.
Comparative law also plays a role in suggesting new paths for
United States lawyers. French and German law protect interests not cur-
rently protected in the United States. For example, temporary residences
such as hotel rooms,39 9 private papers,"' and medical evidence are better
protected in the civil-law countries than in the United States." 1
To be sure, numerous countries have rejected exclusion. In any con-
stitutional system, exclusion requires a commitment to the rights of pri-
vacy, defense, and other civil rights. It is no accident that only those
countries with strong civil rights values and independent judiciaries have
made this commitment.
399. See supra note 262.
400. See supra note 304.
401. See Judgment of May 24, 1977, BVerfG, W. Ger., 44 BVerfGE 353 (1977).
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